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Agathon Fric*

Popping the Question: What the Questionnaire
for Federal Judicial Appointments Reveals about
the Pursuit of Justice, Diversity, and the
Commitment to Transparency

Since 2017, the Canadian government has published excerpts from questionnaires
that prospective judges completed as part of the judicial selection process, subjecting
newly appointed superior and federal court judges to a degree of scrutiny that is
unprecedented in Canadian history. Using this novel source material, this article
explores what a sample of 16 judges’ questionnaires do and do not say about the
individuals behind the robes. This review suggests that those appointed to the bench
in 2017 generally demonstrate insight into the judicial role in Canada. However,
some provide only supercial responses, others parrot back normative values
that the government has already prescribed, and many offer substantially similar
answers. This suggests, rst, that not all successful applications or, for that matter,
applicants are created equal and, second, that applicants use the questionnaire less
as an opportunity to demonstrate free thought and more as a test to prove their
fealty to dominant assumptions about the court’s role in society. The questionnaire
therefore misses an opportunity to show that diversity on the bench is more than
skin-deep. Meanwhile, recent trends show that the government has lagged behind
on its commitment to make judges’ applications public. The article concludes that if
the government is serious about introducing greater transparency and accountability
to the judicial selection process, then it should revise the questionnaire to elicit more
meaningful responses from applicants and table legislation to codify the government’s
political promise to publish appointees’ views on the role of the judiciary in Canadian
society.
Depuis 2017, le gouvernement canadien publie des extraits des questionnaires
remplis par les juges potentiels dans le cadre du processus de sélection judiciaire,
soumettant ainsi les juges des cours supérieures et fédérales nouvellement nommés
à un degré d’examen sans précédent dans l’histoire du Canada. En utilisant ce
nouveau matériel de base, le présent article explore ce qu’un échantillon de 16
questionnaires de juges disent et ne disent pas à propos des individus portant la
toge. Cet examen suggère que les personnes nommées à la magistrature en 2017
font généralement preuve d’une bonne connaissance du rôle judiciaire au Canada.
Cependant, certains ne donnent que des réponses supercielles, d’autres reprennent
les valeurs normatives que le gouvernement a déjà prescrites, et beaucoup offrent
des réponses substantiellement similaires. Cela suggère, premièrement, que toutes
les candidatures retenues ou, d’ailleurs, les candidats eux-mêmes ne sont pas créés
égaux et, deuxièmement, que les candidats utilisent le questionnaire moins comme
une occasion de démontrer leur libre pensée et plus comme un test pour prouver
leur délité aux hypothèses dominantes sur le rôle de la cour dans la société. Le
questionnaire manque donc une occasion de montrer que la diversité sur le banc
est plus que supercielle. Entre-temps, les tendances récentes montrent que le
gouvernement a pris du retard dans son engagement à rendre publiques les requêtes
des juges. L’article conclut que si le gouvernement souhaite sérieusement introduire
plus de transparence et de responsabilité dans le processus de sélection des juges,
il devrait alors réviser le questionnaire pour obtenir des réponses plus signicatives
de la part des candidats et déposer un projet de loi pour codier la promesse
politique du gouvernement de publier les opinions des personnes nommées sur le
rôle du pouvoir judiciaire dans la société canadienne.
*
B.A. Hons. (Carleton), J.D. (Dalhousie), LL.M. (Harvard). Agathon is a lawyer in Calgary. He
thanks the justices of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta for inspiring him to pursue this project,
Investigator Normand Sirois of the Ofce of the Information Commissioner of Canada for guiding
him through the Access to Information process, Oren Tamir for offering constructive feedback and
constant reassurance, and Professor Mark Tushnet, whose supervision was invaluable to this project.

160 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Introduction
I. Scope and methodology
II. The Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments
1. The rules were made to be broken
2. Judicial federalism invites cross-province comparisons
3. It pays to be humble (but it pays more to know your audience)
4. How law and justice develop: practice, principle, and
recognition
5. Diversity is good (and vague)
6. A reasonable apprehension of “bees”?
III. On transparency and priorities
Recommendations and conclusion

Introduction
On 27 April 2007, Kristine Eidsvik reached what might be described as
the pinnacle of her career. Eidsvik, then a no-nonsense litigator in her late
forties, had made a career out of being “rst”—the rst woman to become
an associate at the law rm founded by former Alberta premier John
Brownlee and, later, the rst woman to become a partner at a prominent
Calgary rm.1 On this day, Eidsvik became the Government of Canada’s
latest appointee to Alberta’s superior trial court, the Court of Queen’s
Bench.2 Five months earlier, the newly christened Harper government
had implemented reforms to the regional Judicial Advisory Committees
that, since 1988, have been responsible for evaluating applications and
recommending nominees for federally appointed courts to the Minister of
Justice. Most notably, after November 2006, Committees could no longer
“highly recommend” candidates, as had been the practice in previous
decades; instead, they could only “recommend” or “not recommend” a
candidate, raising questions about whether this would permit ideology to
eclipse merit in the Minister’s nal analysis.3
1.
Lerina Koornhof, “Alumni Prole: The Honourable Kristine Eidsvik” University of Alberta
(5 April 2017), online: <web.archive.org/web/20170425080757/https://www.ualberta.ca/law/news/
main-news/2017/april/the-honourable-kristine-eidsvik> [perma.cc/MK59-Y6TL].
2.
Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Alberta Judicial Appointments Announced”
(27 April 2007), online: <webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca:8080/wayback/20071116045906/http://canada.
justice.gc.ca/en/news/ja/2007/doc_32008.html> [perma.cc/DWH2-45GS].
3.
Rosemary Cairns Way, “Deliberate Disregard: Judicial Appointments under the Harper
Government” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 43 at 56. See also Canada, Department of Justice, News Release,
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In 2018, eleven years after her appointment, Justice Eidsvik was still
making news, but for all the wrong reasons. Eidsvik was describing one
of her experiences conducting a judicial dispute resolution4 to a classroom
of law students when she admitted that she felt uncomfortable being in a
room “full of big dark people.” She reportedly said she “was used to being
in her ‘ivory tower’ where [she is] normally ‘removed from the riff raff.’”5
Within 24 hours, she had apologized to the students, saying she “felt sick”
by what she had said and that “as soon as it came out of [her] mouth, [she]
recognized [the comments were] not appropriate and could be construed
as insensitive to racial minorities.”6 To her credit, Eidsvik completed a
course on cultural competence on her own initiative and, in April 2018, the
body tasked with disciplining judicial misconduct, the Canadian Judicial
Council, dismissed four complaints against her, concluding that “this
[was] an isolated incident and it is not necessary to take further action.”7
Justice Eidsvik might have been joking, but her “ivory tower”
metaphor is an apt depiction of superior courts across Canada, whose
judges are overwhelmingly old, white men. If federally appointed judges
were characters in Guess Who?—the children’s board game in which
players ask each other yes-or-no questions to whittle down a eld of
possible suspects—then one would be hard-pressed to nd many physical
features to distinguish between them. Is your judge black? Guess again.
From 2009 to 2012, 98 out of the 100 judges appointed by the federal
government were white. The remaining two were Métis.8 Is your judge
a woman? Probably not.9 In 2014, then-Justice Minister Peter MacKay
“Minister Toews Pleased to Announce Changes to Judicial Advisory Committees” (10 November
2006), online:
<www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2006/11/minister-toews-pleased-announcechanges-judicial-advisory-committees.html> [perma.cc/82Y4-723M].
4.
Judicial dispute resolution is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that can be binding or
non-binding. It offers litigants a chance to have their dispute resolved by a sitting judge in a closed
boardroom without the trappings of an ordinary trial and strict rules of evidence.
5.
Meghan Grant & Lucie Edwardson, “Calgary judge apologizes to law students for comments
‘insensitive to racial minorities,’” CBC News (5 January 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
calgary/judge-university-calgary-law-students-comments-kristine-eidsvik-apology-1.4474760>
[perma.cc/SW4D-EX7M].
6.
Ibid.
7.
Canadian Judicial Council, News Release, “Canadian Judicial Council completes its review of
complaints against the Honourable Kristine Eidsvik” (10 April 2018), online: <cjc-ccm.ca/en/news/
canadian-judicial-council-completes-its-review-complaints-against-honourable-kristine-eidsvik>
[perma.cc/XYY4-3L5M].
8.
Kirk Makin, “Of 100 new federally appointed judges 98 are white, Globe nds,” The Globe
and Mail (17 April 2012), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/of-100-new-federallyappointed-judges-98-are-white-globe-nds/article4101504> [perma.cc/N3MX-2HL6].
9.
From 2007 to 2017, 64 per cent of all federal judicial appointees were male: Ofce of the
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Judges Appointed between 2007 and 2017, by
gender (27 October 2017), online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/AppointedByGender-
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explained that women “aren’t applying” because they would rather stay at
home with their children than travel the judicial circuit.10 His comments
were roundly criticized.11 Does your justice have white hair? Most likely.
As applicants need to have practised law for at least ten years to be eligible
for appointment,12 most judges are late in their careers by the time they
join the bench. In addition, one in four federally appointed judges have
elected supernumerary status, a kind of semi-retirement, which means
they are between 65 and 75 years old.13 The total number of judges over
65 is even higher, as not all will have accumulated the requisite years of
service to be eligible for supernumerary status and not all would elect that
status, even if they could do so.
In this way, Justice Eidsvik is something of a contradiction. On
one hand, she is among the minority of federally appointed judges who
are women. On the other hand, her “injudicious”14 comments bear the
unmistakable mark of a person who belongs to the dominant social group.
As one student noted, “what was shocking was the ease at which [her
comment] came…it was almost like she was ignorant to the fact it was
offensive.”15 Without a record of her application to become a judge or the
reasons for her selection, it is impossible to say whether the government
would have appointed Justice Eidsvik but for its changes to the selection
process in 2006. But one thing is clear: her comments demonstrate the
harm that can occur when judges do not or, by virtue of their privilege,
cannot empathize with the communities they serve.

eng.html> [perma.cc/36L9-UETW].
10. Tonda MacCharles, “Peter MacKay tries to explain lack of diversity on federal courts,” The
Toronto Star (18 June 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/06/18/peter_mackay_
tries_to_explain_lack_of_diversity_on_federal_courts.html> [perma.cc/FFV5-JD2J].
11. See e.g. Tonda MacCharles, “Lawyer disputes Peter MacKay’s claim that women, visible
minorities don’t apply to be judges,” The Toronto Star (19 June 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/
news/canada/2014/06/19/lawyer_disputes_peter_mackays_claim_that_women_visible_minorities_
dont_apply_to_be_judges.html> [perma.cc/E25C-TSY8]; Breese Davies, “Lack of women, minority
judges not due to baby-making,” The Toronto Star (24 June 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/
commentary/2014/06/24/lack_of_women_minority_judges_not_due_to_babymaking.html> [perma.
cc/8T2M-CBMH].
12. See Ofce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Guidelines for Judicial
Advisory Committee Members (October 2016) at Appendix A, online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointmentsnominations/committees-comites/guidelines-lignes-eng.html>
[perma.cc/8HGR-ZWKR]
[JAC
Guidelines].
13. See Ofce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Number of Federally
Appointed Judges in Canada (3 September 2019), online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/
judges-juges-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/RV9W-F5E9]. For supernumerary status eligibility, see Canadian
Superior Courts Judges Association, Supernumerary and Retired Judges, online: <www.cscja.ca/
about-us/constitution/supernumerary-and-retired-judges> [perma.cc/6LUG-95DN].
14. Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 7.
15. Grant & Edwardson, supra note 5.
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Fortunately, there are signs of improvement. In 2015, Justin Trudeau’s
Liberals successfully campaigned on a New Plan for a Strong Middle
Class, including a platform to promote “Fair and Open Government.”
That meant, among other things, a pledge to “make the Supreme Court
appointment process more transparent”16 and to “build a government as
diverse as Canada” by adopting “a new government-wide appointment
process that is open and based on merit.”17 This new ethos would extend
beyond the top court to all federal judicial appointees, including judges of
the Federal Court and the superior courts of the provinces. As Trudeau’s
theory went, “[o]ur country is stronger, and our government more effective,
when decision-makers reect Canada’s diversity.”18
This logic is a common refrain among judicial selection reformers.
Although the ways in which judges are chosen vary around the world,
many agree that a diverse bench is preferable to a homogenous one.19 But
in what sense(s) is Canada diverse and how can or should governments
seek to replicate this diversity among their ranks, if at all? If diversity in the
judiciary means racial diversity, as it often does, then one might argue that
diversity is inessential to a well-functioning justice system—that, beyond
playing some vague representative function, it is little more than window
dressing on the cold application of law. Indeed, some reject the notion that
courts can or should play a representative role at all, representation being
a function traditionally reserved for legislatures.20
However, whether or not one believes that courts have a moral or
institutional obligation to visibly reect the communities that they serve,
16. Liberal Party of Canada, “Real Change: A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class” (2015) at 30,
online (pdf): <www.liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/New-plan-for-a-strong-middle-class.pdf>
[perma.cc/A43H-E529].
17. Ibid at 34.
18. Ibid.
19. For a Canadian perspective, see Samreen Beg & Lorne Sossin, “Diversity, Transparency and
Inclusion in Canada’s Judiciary” in Graham Gee & Erika Rackley, eds, Debating Judicial Appointments
in an Age of Diversity (London: Routledge, 2017) at 118-141. For a view from across the pond, see
Lady Hale of Richmond, “How Diverse Are Judges?” in Jeremy Cooper, ed, Being a Judge in the
Modern World (New York: Oxford UP, 2017) 183 at 184-185. Baroness Hale of Richmond, President
of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the rst woman appointed to that court, offers four
rationales for increasing diversity on the bench: boost the judiciary’s democratic legitimacy, manifest
the equality that courts purport to uphold, avoid wasting talent, and achieve a difference in outcomes.
20. See e.g. Sophie Turenne, “Fair Reection of Society in Judicial Systems” in Sophie Turenne,
ed, Fair Reection of Society in Judicial Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Heidelberg: Springer
International, 2015) at 1. Turenne argues that speaking of a court’s “representativeness” conicts with
notions of judicial independence and impartiality. Turenne prefers to speak of racial diversity on the
bench as only one among many possible procedural and institutional reforms designed to enhance the
court’s reection of society, which is an independently worthy goal. Cf Lorne Sossin, “Should Canada
Have a Representative Supreme Court?” in Nadia Verrelli, ed, The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming
Canada’s Supreme Court (Toronto: McGill–Queen’s UP, 2013) at 27.
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there are also pragmatic reasons to do so. First, as natural scientists
have recognized, that which is more diverse tends to be more resilient
and, to that extent, more sustainable.21 The same may be said of social
institutions, including courts, whose legitimacy depends not only on the
constitution, but also on the public’s condence in them and on respect
for the rule of law. These latter conditions are strongest when people feel
that the justice system is of, for, and by them. In 2020, in a country as
diverse as Canada, where 22.3 per cent of citizens are visible minorities,22
a predominantly “male, pale, and frail”23 judiciary simply will not do.
Second, there is “growing empirical evidence” that judges from diverse
groups judge differently, sometimes producing substantively different—
and, diversity advocates would argue, better—outcomes than their white,
male colleagues.24
Yet, quite apart from challenging whether the Trudeau government’s
faith in diversity is preferable to its alternative, there is the question of
whether and how states can meaningfully achieve diversity among their
courts. Recent changes in Canada’s judicial appointments process offer a
unique case study to evaluate the extent to which this avowed commitment
to diversity is manifested in the opinions and personality traits of
recent appointees. On 20 October 2016, the Minister of Justice, Jody
Wilson-Raybould, announced a new process to “increase the openness,
transparency, accountability, and diversity of Canada’s judiciary.”25 The
Minister made three notable changes, all targeting the Judicial Advisory
Committees. Wilson-Raybould “reconstituted committees [to] better
reect the diversity of our great country[;] revised committee mandates
to increase the independence of their processes; and [adopted] an
open selection process for the three members of each committee who
represent the general public….”26 In short, the government had undone
21. See e.g. Paul Leslie & J Terrence McCabe, “Response Diversity and Resilience in SocialEcological Systems” (2013) 54:2 Current Anthropology 114.
22. See Statistics Canada, Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity Highlight Tables (Census
Program Data Products, 2016), online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/hltfst/imm/Table.cfm?Lang=E&T=41&Geo=00&SP=1&vismin=2&age=1&sex=1> [perma.cc/SB7JAGA2].
23. I owe this phrase to a 2007 Carleton University lecture delivered by Peter Grifths, who was then
Associate Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice.
24. Rosemary Hunter, “More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-making”
(2015) 68 Curr Legal Probs 119 at 124, 129.
25. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada announces judicial
appointments and reforms the appointments process to increase openness and transparency” (20
October 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2016/10/government-canadaannounces-judicial-appointments-reforms-appointments-process-increase-openness-transparency.
html> [perma.cc/78A3-NRF2].
26. Ibid.
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the controversial changes ushered in by the Harper government in 2006:
gone was the police representative on the committee, back was the “highly
recommended” category, and new was the emphasis on selecting women
and visible minorities for the committees in the hope that their own
diversity would trickle down to their non-binding recommendations for
judicial appointment.27
A fourth change escaped mainstream attention: after October 2016,
certain parts of a successful application for federal judicial appointment
would be released to the public.28 Since then, the government has published
excerpts from questionnaires that prospective judges completed as part
of the selection process, subjecting newly appointed superior and federal
court judges to a degree of scrutiny that is unprecedented in Canadian
history. As the Department of Justice describes it, “[t]he questionnaires
are used by the Judicial Advisory Committees across Canada to review
candidates and submit a list of ‘highly recommended’ and ‘recommended’
candidates for consideration by the Minister of Justice. Candidates are
advised that part of their questionnaire could be made available to the
public, should they be appointed to the bench.”29 So far, the government
has released data from Parts 5, 6, 7, and 11 of the questionnaire, which
cover a judge’s language, education, work history, and views on the role
of the judiciary in Canada’s legal system, respectively. By 31 December
2017, the government had appointed 89 judges whose applications it has
published or has promised to publish “shortly.”30 This number includes
appointments in each of the ten provinces, as well as appointments to the
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal. It excludes prothonotaries;
nominees to the Supreme Court of Canada, who follow a distinct selection
27. A January 2017 press release announcing that the government had reconstituted Judicial
Advisory Committees in several provinces emphasized that women made up “a strong majority of
the new JACs and minority groups have unprecedented representation”: Canada, Department of
Justice, News Release, “Minister of Justice announces Judicial Advisory Committee appointments”
(19 January 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/01/minister-justiceannounces-judicial-advisory-committee-appointments.html> [perma.cc/EV42-YWU5].
28. Canada, Department of Justice, Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments (4 August
2017), online (pdf): <www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/forms-formulaires/cq-qc/pdf/
Questionnaire-for-Federal-Judicial-Appointments-Aug-04-2017.pdf>
[perma.cc/5CLZ-UEL9]
[Questionnaire].
29. See e.g. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice David M. Paciocco’s
Questionnaire (7 April 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/04/
the_honourable_justicedavidmpacioccosquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/878C-8225] [Paciocco’s
Questionnaire].
30. See e.g. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada announces judicial
appointment in the province of Quebec” (19 December 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/departmentjustice/news/2017/12/government_of_canadaannouncesjudicialappointmentintheprovinceofq.html>
[perma.cc/AQZ2-7EB2].
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process; deputy judges to the territories; and judges who already held
federal judicial ofce when they were elevated to the Court of Appeal,
reallocated to the superior court in their province, or promoted to Chief
Justice.31 Table 1 shows the distribution of federally appointed judges in
the rst year after the Minister’s reforms took effect.
Table 1: Federal Judicial Appointments by Jurisdiction
from 20 October 2016 to 31 December 2017 32
Jurisdiction

Number of rst-time federal judicial
appointees
(excludes promotions and demotions of
existing federal appointees)

Ontario

30

Quebec

16

British Columbia

14

Alberta

9

Federal

6

Newfoundland and Labrador

5

Nova Scotia

3

Prince Edward Island

3

Manitoba

1

New Brunswick

1

Saskatchewan

1

TOTAL

89

Of the government’s 89 appointments made under the new process
in 2017, 16 have questionnaires that are presently available to the public,
as listed in Table 2. This study uses the information in Part 11 of these
questionnaires to produce a qualitative analysis of judges’ views on the
role of the judiciary, operating on the premise that there is public value in
getting to know the people behind the decisions that help to regulate our
lives. Who we empower to settle disputes among us tells us something
about who we are as a society. And to the extent that these answers represent
31. There is one exception: see footnote in Appendix A.
32. See Appendix A for a full list of appointees by date, name, and jurisdiction. The Minister
announced the new process in 2016, but she did not appoint anyone under it until 2017.
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their authors’ actual opinions, they become self-fullling prophecies
after an applicant’s appointment to the bench. Thus, studying judges’ job
applications offers a rare window into these decision-makers’ psyches.
Table 2: Judges appointed by the Federal Government in 2017 whose
questionnaires are publicly accessible as of 1 January 2020
(by date of appointment)
Date

Jurisdiction

Appointee

Court
Level

3/9

PEI

Clements, Tracey L. (Q.C.)

Trial

3/24

AB

deWit, William T. (Q.C.)

Trial

3/24

AB

Hollins, Michele H. (Q.C.)

Trial

3/24

AB

Khullar, Ritu (Q.C.)

Trial

3/24

AB

Slawinsky, The Honourable Marilyn

Trial

3/24

QC

Moore, Benoît

Trial

4/7

ON

Paciocco, The Honourable David M.

Appellate

4/7

ON

Swartz, Deborah

Trial

4/12

BC

Mayer, Andrew Phillip Avtar

Trial

4/12

ON

Bell, Robyn M. Ryan

Trial

4/12

ON

Nakatsuru, The Honourable Shaun S.

Trial

5/12

BC

Riley, W. Paul (Q.C.)

Trial

6/14

BC

Milman, Warren B.

Trial

6/23

BC

Brundrett, Michael J.

Trial

6/23

Federal

Pentney, William F.

Trial

6/23

ON

Gomery, Sally A.

Trial

One could argue this is a useless endeavour that reads too much
into judges’ answers, which cannot be understood apart from the
practical requirements for which they were created.33 In other words, the
questionnaires might say more about what applicants think the government
wants to hear—what they think will get them appointed—than what the
33. See Lisa Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research” in Peter Cane &
Herbert M Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford UP,
2010) at 939.
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applicants themselves believe. Their content could be described as either
style or substance. But if it is all style, then one might ask what the
government expects to achieve by publishing judges’ responses, why the
government would ask questions that elicit supercial answers or, if the
questions are serious, then why the government would appoint people who
do not demonstrate substantial insight into the role of Canadian courts. In
each of these cases, public condence in the judicial branch of government
is undermined. On the other hand, if the content of these questionnaires
is substantive, then they represent a cache of information that might tell
Canadians something about their judiciary that is troubling or reassuring.
In view of the Judicial Advisory Committees’ secrecy, the only way to
know is to dissect the answers that the committees themselves relied upon
in making their recommendations for appointment.
An initial review of the available questionnaires suggests that many
of their authors do demonstrate insight into the judicial role in Canada.
However, some provide only supercial responses, others parrot back
normative values that the government has already prescribed, and many
offer substantially similar answers. This suggests, rst, that not all successful
applications or, for that matter, applicants are created equal and, second,
that applicants use the questionnaire less as a platform to demonstrate free
thought and more as a test to prove their fealty to traditional assumptions
about the court’s role in society. This is not surprising in view of the
judiciary’s history as a primarily reactive and conservative institution,34
but it means that the questions miss an opportunity to show that diversity
on the bench runs deeper than the eye can see. Thus, the questionnaire
should be revised to elicit more meaningful responses from prospective
appointees if the government is serious about its commitment to greater
transparency and accountability in the appointment of federal and superior
court judges.
I. Scope and methodology
This article is about whether judges’ applications convey “a deep
understanding of the judicial role in Canada,” as the government suggests
they should.35 It is not about the visible elements of diversity, except to the
extent that they implicate or suggest differences in the way judges view
the role of the judiciary. The goal is not to tally the number of women
34. This is a function of the court’s after-the-fact adjudication of disputes and the common-law
principle of stare decisis, which preserves the status quo and fosters restraint. See e.g. Stephen R
Perry, “Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law” (1987) 7:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 215 at
248.
35. See Questionnaire, supra note 28, Part 11.
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or to count the number of ethnicities represented on the bench.36 Instead,
this study considers the degree to which judges appointed by the Liberal
government in 2017 exhibit philosophical or ideological diversity. It does
this by looking at a sample of 16 judges’ answers to two of six questions
on the role of the judiciary in Canada’s legal system contained in Part
11 of the Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments. Therefore,
the completed questionnaires of these seven women and nine men gure
prominently in the analysis.
This study is exploratory, inductive, and qualitative. It is not meant
to be exhaustive or to unearth every trend one might derive from these
questionnaires, which are data-rich and difcult to assimilate. Rather than
measure the frequency with which certain concepts arise in the text of
judicial applications, which would have limited utility in a sample this size,
this project seeks to build an understanding of the range of answers judges
have given by observing the presence or absence of certain substantive
themes and stylistic devices to arrive at conclusions about what is true of the
sample, even if it is not 100 per cent representative of the larger population
that the Liberal government has appointed to federal and superior courts
in Canada.37 In doing so, the hope is that this reveals something about how
these particular judges relate to notions of justice and interact with the
Judicial Advisory Committees that evaluate their applications. The point is
not to suggest that the competence and abilities of judges are static, or that
an application is the only or best way to predict a candidate’s likelihood
of a long, successful, and inuential tenure on the bench. However, the
Questionnaire is one of the primary tools the government uses to gauge
an applicant’s suitability for the judicial role and, in that sense, it is no
trivial matter. The intention is to start the discussion about the value and
possible consequences of publishing judges’ applications—not to preempt
it. In addition, this project is limited insofar as there could be errors in
the government’s publication of the data that skews or misrepresents
what judges intended when they answered the questionnaire. As written
media, the questionnaires do not enable the reader to seek clarication
36. This work, which is important in its own right, is starting to be done by the Ofce of the
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. Since 2017, it has published statistics on the number
of judicial applicants and appointees who self-identify as members of various gender, racial,
Indigenous, disability, linguistic, and sexual minority groups: see Ofce of the Commissioner for
Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Statistics regarding Judicial Applicants and Appointees (October
21, 2016–October 27, 2017), online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/StatisticsCandidateStatistiquesCandidat-2017-eng.html> [perma.cc/YR8F-FJ4T].
37. Webley, supra note 33 at 927. Nor can this essay’s observations generalize to all 1,216 federally
appointed judges in ofce as of 3 September 2019: see Number of Federally Appointed Judges in
Canada, supra note 13.
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or elaboration, as the Judicial Advisory Committees who screened the
applications might have done38 and, in any event, such follow-up could be
construed as violating an applicant’s ethical duty to avoid commenting on
issues that he may come to adjudicate now that he is in ofce.39
Part II begins by exploring what the questionnaires do or do not suggest
about the judges that the government has appointed. Part III introduces
an important caveat on the government’s commitment to transparency—
namely, the signicant turnaround time to release judges’ applications to
the public after their appointments. That section asks and then answers
what might explain the delay and what this means for the government’s
reform agenda. Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting ways that the
Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments could be improved.
II. The Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments
Lawyers and judges who are interested in becoming a federal or superior
court judge apply by downloading an application form styled the
“Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments” from the Ofce of the
Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs’ website. The Questionnaire,
which was last revised on 27 October 2017, is available in English and
French. It instructs candidates on how to complete the application and
where to mail it. The 25-page Questionnaire is divided into 12 parts.40 Part
11, titled “The Role of the Judiciary in Canada’s Legal System,” states:
The Government of Canada seeks to appoint judges with a deep
understanding of the judicial role in Canada. In order to provide a more
complete basis for evaluation, candidates are asked to offer their insight
into broader issues concerning the judiciary and Canada’s legal system.

38. The Questionnaire is a big part of the application, but it is not the only or even the most important
part. Along with the Questionnaire, applicants must submit a background check consent form, a form
authorizing one’s provincial law society to release information to the government, and ve legal
writing samples. As noteworthy as what the written part of the application contains is what it does
not. For instance, the Questionnaire discloses that the “Judicial Advisory Committee consults widely,
both within and outside the sources provided in this Questionnaire, and in making enquiries will make
every effort to maintain condentiality” [emphasis added]. Thus, the Questionnaire is only the tip of
the iceberg of what a Judicial Advisory Committee may consider in evaluating a candidate’s t for the
judicial role. Judicial Advisory Committees are known to solicit information directly from references
listed in Part 3, including opposing counsel and sitting judges, to develop a more candid assessment of
the applicant’s credentials: see JAC Guidelines, supra note 12.
39. See e.g. Ofce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Ethical, Change of
Lifestyle and Other Considerations” in Guide for Candidates, online: <www.fja.gc.ca/appointmentsnominations/guideCandidates-eng.html> [perma.cc/U9XB-JJ6R].
40. These cover different personal information about one’s demographics, language prociency,
legal and non-legal work experience, education, awards, community involvement, notable cases,
publications, presentations, character issues, disciplinary history, and health: see Questionnaire, supra
note 28.
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For each of the following questions, please provide answers of between
750 and 1000 words.
1.

What would you regard as your most signicant contribution to the
law and the pursuit of justice in Canada?

2.

How has your experience provided you with insight into the variety
and diversity of Canadians and their unique perspectives?

3.

Describe the appropriate role of a judge in a constitutional
democracy.

4.

Who is the audience for the decisions rendered by the court(s) to
which you are applying?

5.

Please describe the personal qualities, professional skills and
abilities, and life experience that you believe will equip you for the
role of a judge.

6.

Given the goal of ensuring that Canadians are able to look at the
justices appointed to the bench and see their faces and life experiences
reected there, you may, if you choose, provide information about
yourself that you feel would assist in this objective.41

In keeping with this article’s exploratory purpose, it focuses on Questions
1 and 2, making only general references to Questions 3 to 6. Before turning
to examine the substance of applicants’ answers, it is worth making a few
general observations, given the novelty of the source material.
1. The rules were made to be broken
First, answers to Part 11 are sometimes as notable for what they do not
say as for what they do. For example, although the government requested
that candidates provide answers of between 750 and 1000 words each, the
applicants in this study often ignored that instruction altogether. As Table 3
shows, only 36 of the 80 answers studied (45 per cent) fell within or above
the specied word range. More than half (55 per cent) of all answers fell
below the required response length. All but two of the 16 questionnaires
studied had one or more answers that fell below the required 750-word
minimum. Question 4 on the audience for judicial decisions was the most
under-answered (11 answers below range), followed by Questions 2 and
3 on diversity and the appropriate role of a judge, respectively (9 answers
each), Question 1 on one’s contributions to the law (8 answers), and
Question 5 on the applicant’s personal qualities (7 answers). On average,
respondents wrote the least about a court’s audience and the most about
their personal qualities, professional skills, and abilities.

41.

Ibid at 19-24 [emphasis in original].
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Table 3: Word Counts of Appointees’ Answers to Questions in Part 11 of the
Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments42
PART 11 – QUESTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY IN CANADA’S LEGAL SYSTEM
APPOINTEE
(IN ORDER OF
APPOINTMENT)

1

2

3

4

5

6†

Tracey L. Clements, Q.C.

304

206

William T. deWit, Q.C.

690

582

123

79

476

163

904

880

794

Michele H. Hollins, Q.C.

568

222

536

355

236

407

350

Ritu Khullar, Q.C.
The Hon. Marilyn Slawinsky

759

519

447

338

616

620

783

722

517

871

936

375

Benoît Moore

836

801

819

748

918

368

The Hon. David M. Paciocco

1171

827

1013

1136

1078

314

Deborah Swartz

767

856

539

183

635

557

Andrew Phillip Avtar Mayer

737

673

666

707

926

352

Robyn M. Ryan Bell

821

799

734

735

742

136

The Hon. Shaun S. Nakatsuru

621

611

610

668

601

665

W. Paul Riley, Q.C.

502

387

774

725

1066

89

Warren B. Milman

836

815

913

767

948

-

Michael J. Brundrett

702

754

895

796

819

11

William F. Pentney

382

519

772

457

997

379

Sally A. Gomery

871

823

749

524

713

583

MEAN AVERAGE

709

652

677

616

792

324

†OPTIONAL

IN RANGE

ABOVE RANGE

BELOW RANGE

Signicantly, Part 11 is the only part of the Questionnaire with a
specied word range. It was open to the government to place no limits
on length or to specify only an upper limit, as is often the case with
standard forms. That it chose not to, combined with the form’s signal
that the government “seeks to appoint judges with a deep understanding
of the judicial role in Canada,” implies that the length of an applicant’s
response was meant to be treated as a proxy for the depth of his or her
answer. That assumption might not always be accurate, but neither is it
42. All word counts are from the English-language version of the questionnaires except for Quebec
appointee Benoît Moore, whose numbers are from the French questionnaire: see Canada, Department
of Justice, The Honourable Justice Benoît Moore’s Questionnaire (31 March 2017), online: <www.
canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_justicebenoitmooresquestionnaire.
html> [perma.cc/X76N-TWTZ] [Moore’s Questionnaire]. It is possible that these word counts reect
abridged versions of the applicant’s answers; however, one may assume they are the original answers,
as the published questionnaires do not indicate that they have been revised. Still, some editing has
probably occurred because it is unlikely all the applicants drafted their answers as bulleted points,
which is how they appear online.

Popping the Question: What the Questionnaire for
Federal Judicial Appointments Reveals…

173

unreasonable. For example, Justice Clements used her rst chance to show
the government that she has a deep understanding of the appropriate role
of a judge in a constitutional democracy by providing the shortest, and
most glib, of all the answers to Question 3:
I have chosen to provide a somewhat “philosophical” answer. There is a
strong argument to be made that a judge in a constitutional democracy is
the legal and moral compass of society. This is a heavy, heavy burden. A
judge really is both the gatekeeper and the caretaker of a constitutional
democracy. He or she is the paramount “check and balance” in our
system. The eight [sic] and burden of those roles is not lost to me. I [sic]
does seem to me that our system really must constantly strive to strike the
balance of upholding and respective [sic] the rule of law (which forms
the very foundation of our system and our society) but also recognizing
the many, many challenges and obstacles that many face.43

Contrast her 123-word answer with a small excerpt from Justice Riley’s
longer, 774-word response to the same question:
In a constitutional democracy, democratically elected legislatures have
the mandate and authority to enact legislation for the benet of their
constituents, but only within the limits set out in the constitution. The
role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy is to uphold and
enforce these constitutional limits. In other words, judges are called
upon to ensure that legislation and executive actions of the government
do not exceed the limits set out in the constitution. Two particular areas
in which courts are most commonly required to perform this function are
(i) by adjudicating upon the division of legislative powers between the
federal and provincial governments (“Division of Powers”), and (ii) by
protecting and enforcing individual rights under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).
[…]44

In fewer words, this excerpt from Justice Riley’s answer manages to touch
upon three dimensions of Canada’s judiciary that Justice Clements’ does
not—at least not explicitly: the court’s role in reviewing legislation for
compliance with the constitution, the possibility for conict between
federal and provincial laws, and the superiority of individual rights vis-àvis Parliament.

43. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Tracey L. Clements’ Questionnaire
(9 March 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_
justicetraceylclementsquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/599C-PP8K].
44. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable W. Paul Riley’s Questionnaire (1
November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
wpaulrileysquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/BNX6-VSBC] [Riley’s Questionnaire].
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The point of this exercise is not to suggest that Justice Clements’
answer is normatively wrong and Justice Riley’s is correct. Nor is it to
criticize Justice Clements as a person, to imply that she could not be a fair
and impartial arbiter, or to suggest that Justice Riley knows something that
she does not. However, it is fair to say that, in relative terms, her answer
is not as sophisticated as Justice Riley’s and, in absolute terms, her answer
is decient because it fell below the requested word range, while his did
not. In most spheres, including the law, concision is an underrated virtue,
but a concise answer is not necessarily a complete one. Question 3 alone,
which implicates normative theories of constitutionalism, democracy, and
institutional design, could justiably be the subject of a 3,000-word essay.
If the purpose of the Questionnaire is to demonstrate a deep understanding,
then surely completeness at the risk of verbosity is preferable to brevity at
the risk of appearing ignorant.
This observation has three implications. First, given that most
applicants fail to answer consistently within the specied word range, it is
questionable whether those applicants demonstrate a deep understanding of
the subject matter. Second, one might doubt the suitability of an applicant
for judicial ofce who disregards formal rules as basic as “provide answers
of between 750 and 1000 words.” If they cannot or will not do that before
their appointment, then what rules will they not follow or what reasons
will they not disclose when they make decisions on the bench? Third, if
Judicial Advisory Committees and the Minister are willing to overlook this
indiscretion, as they have shown by appointing judges who provide less
than full answers, then how much value do they ascribe to these questions
and their answers? Clearly, short, supercial answers are no bar to judicial
appointment.
On the other hand, one could argue that the minimum word requirement
is unnecessary at best and counterproductive at worst. For example,
Justice Slawinsky’s application is eloquent, thoughtful, and thorough in
well under 750 words:
The appropriate role of a judge in a constitutional democracy is a complex
and multifaceted one. It is complex because the role contains a core of
important responsibilities that include resolving disputes, interpreting
and enforcing the law, and upholding and ensuring constitutional rights
and freedoms for the benet and protection of all citizens.
It is multifaceted, because layered over this core of responsibilities
are the obligations and expectations placed on a judge regarding the
manner in which she carries out those responsibilities. This includes
the obligations of a judge to be impartial, objective, independent, and
fair, and the expectations that a judge should at all times be empathetic,
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compassionate, unbiased and open-minded. Ultimately, I believe that
this complex and multifaceted role can be reduced to a single word:
courageous.
[…]45

Answers like this prove that it is possible to convey deep insight into the
judicial role without exceeding 750 words. No reasonably informed person
who reads Justice Slawinsky’s application could deny that, whatever the
questionnaire’s instructions, she has a rened understanding of what it
means to be a judge.46 Moreover, the minimum word count seems to have
induced some applicants to repeat themselves, rather than offer genuinely
new insights. For example, more than once, Justice deWit provided short
answers, followed by discursive essays “to comply with the request that
I answer in 750–1000 words.”47 Ironically, even when he purported to
comply with the range in Question 1, his answer still fell short.48 Similarly,
Justice Gomery spent two-thirds of her 871-word response to Question 1,
which asks applicants to describe their most signicant contribution to
the law and the pursuit of justice in Canada, by listing accomplishments
that were not her most signicant.49 Although this proves that not all
answers or applicants are created equally, it also suggests that it may not
be appropriate to impose the same 750-word minimum on every question.
A minimum word count might make sense when one asks a broad question
on the role of a judge, but not when one asks a narrow question about a
single individual’s past achievements.
2. Judicial federalism invites cross-province comparisons
One might object to the above analysis because it relies in part on comparing
judges appointed on opposite sides of the country, whose applications and
answers would have been vetted by separate Judicial Advisory Committees
with distinct memberships. Certainly, local culture and talent will vary, as
will assessments of what counts as a “good” answer. Lawyers seeking
appointment in Canada’s smallest province, Prince Edward Island (e.g.
45. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Marilyn Slawinsky’s Questionnaire
(31 March 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_
justicemarilynslawinskysquestionnaire0.html> [perma.cc/KX6Z-XR2G] [Slawinsky’s Questionnaire].
46. Her 18 months of experience as a Provincial Court judge doubtless aided her understanding.
47. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice William T. deWit’s Questionnaire (31
March 2017) at Questions 1 and 4, online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/
the_honourable_justicewilliamtdewitsquestionnaire0.html>
[perma.cc/G4S3-ESU6]
[deWit’s
Questionnaire].
48. See Table 3.
49. See Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Sally A. Gomery’s Questionnaire (3
November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
sallyagomerysquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/R6PC-LNJU] [Gomery’s Questionnaire].
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Clements), whose practising Bar is less than two per cent the size of British
Columbia’s,50 do not compete with those in British Columbia (e.g. Riley).
This might explain the difference in the quality of Justice Clements and
Justice Riley’s answers, but it does not excuse it. To suggest that Islanders
should have lower expectations of their judges because of the province’s
size disrespects the people of Prince Edward Island, who are morally
entitled to access the same quality of justice as anywhere else in Canada.
It also offends principles of federalism. For instance, the superior trial
courts to which Clements and Riley were appointed represent a unique
brand of judicial federalism. These courts are “superior” in the sense that
they possess inherent jurisdiction to hear almost any legal matter, a power
they inherited from the common law courts of the United Kingdom before
Confederation. While section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867 preserved
provincial power to administer and reorganize the superior courts, section
96 assigned the power to appoint “Judges of the Superior…Courts in each
Province” to the Governor General, acting on the advice of Cabinet.51 This
was a centralizing feature of the new Dominion’s constitution, designed
to install judges who would be sympathetic to the federal government’s
policies and thereby insulated from “local politics or prejudice.”52 Although
the federal judicial appointments process has become more responsive to
provincial interests over time—for instance, by inviting representatives
from the local chapter of the Canadian Bar Association and the law
society to sit on the Judicial Advisory Committees—the federal Cabinet
retains wide latitude in selecting candidates. If the Minister of Justice is
truly committed to making appointments based on merit, then it is both
reasonable and morally right that the Minister of Justice would use this
distinct authority to assess the quality of applicants for judicial ofce in
one part of the country by reference to applicants in another. Taking such
an approach is not contrary to federalism, but a vindication of it.
Of course, this analysis ignores that the Judicial Advisory Committee
might have recommended Justice Clements in part because of the
government’s new emphasis on diversity. As a Queen’s Counsel and
partner at a leading regional law rm, Clements would have been widely
considered a leader in the profession at the time of her appointment. Her
gender would not have been the only or even the main trait to qualify her
50. See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, “Membership: Statistical Report of the Federation of
Law Societies of Canada” (2016), online (pdf): <sc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Statistics-2016FINAL.pdf> [perma.cc/AFX2-23LK].
51. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5, s 96.
52. Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, Canadian Courts: Law, Politics, and
Process, 2nd ed (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford UP, 2015) at 147-148.
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for the bench, but it would not have hurt her either. This is not to argue
that diversity jeopardizes appointments based on merit, as some in the
media have suggested.53 Rather, the point is that if one accepts Justice
Clements was as qualied a candidate as any, then one should have
reasonably expected her to demonstrate her substantive insight into the
role of the court at the very moment she applied to join its ranks. So far as
her questionnaire can attest, she did not do this, which says as much about
her as it does the Judicial Advisory Committees and the Minister’s lenient
attitude toward shortcomings in the Questionnaire for Federal Judicial
Appointments.54
3. It pays to be humble (but it pays more to know your audience)
Federally appointed judges receive a handsome sum for their labour. As
of 1 April 2019, a trial or appellate court justice earned a base salary of
$329,900 annually. Chief and Associate Chief Justices earned an extra
$31,800.55 Unlike in many civil law countries, where judges are career
bureaucrats, becoming a superior or federal court judge in Canada is
among the highest professional honours a lawyer can achieve. It takes
guts and some measure of egotism for a person to think, rst, that he is
objectively capable of serving as a judge; second, that he deserves to be
appointed next to the hundreds of other contenders who apply each year;
and, third, that he is not only legally but morally qualied to pass judgment
on others in society.
On that basis, one might expect judicial applicants to exhibit an
ingrained sense of superiority in their applications. In fact, the reverse
is true. Most of the questionnaires in this study demonstrate humility on
the part of the successful applicant before appointment. For instance,
Justice Slawinsky attributed her good fortune in life, compared with
those she met as a Provincial Court judge in criminal court, to “luck.”56
Justice Milman cited his “privilege” as imposing a responsibility to give
53. See Sean Fine, “Liberals not always appointing ‘highly recommended’ judges,” The Globe and
Mail (30 October 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/liberal-government-notalways-appointing-top-recommendedjudges/article36766108> [perma.cc/GEQ9-SWSZ]. Cf Anna
Wong, “Dismantling the Roadblocks to Judicial Diversity,” Slaw (21 February 2017), online: <www.
slaw.ca/2017/02/21/dismantling-the-roadblocks-to-judicial-diversity> [perma.cc/AX2F-CGMK].
54. Despite my criticism of Justice Clements’ answers to the questionnaire, the Prime Minister
tapped her to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island less than eight months
after her initial appointment: see Canada, Ofce of the Prime Minister, News Release, “Prime Minister
announces appointment of new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island” (27
October 2017), online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/10/27/prime-minister-announces-appointmentnew-chief-justice-supreme-court-prince-edward> [perma.cc/8U9W-4ZUP].
55. Guide for Candidates, supra note 39 at “Remuneration.”
56. Slawinsky’s Questionnaire, supra note 45.
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back to the community.57 Justice Hollins insisted that she is “just one
person,” emphasizing the important contributions that all actors make to
the legal system, including legal assistants.58 Justice Nakatsuru struggled
to answer the rst question, saying “it is not in who I am to trumpet my
accomplishments” and that he wanted to be known as someone who
“tried his best.”59 Justice Khullar doubted whether she had made any
“signicant” contribution to law or justice, despite having successfully
intervened at the Supreme Court of Canada on behalf of clients in many
cases, including Vriend v Alberta, which held that the omission of sexual
orientation from provincial human rights legislation violated the Charter
of Rights and Freedom’s equality guarantee.60 The majority even adopted
part of her analysis in its decision.61 By the same token, Justice Paciocco,
a prolic legal scholar whose writing transformed the law of evidence
in Canada, tempered praise for his inuence: “Initially [my] proposals
were met with reluctance. They all now describe the current law. I am
not taking credit for that. Together, many jurists arrived at the same
conclusions.”62 Whether explicitly or implicitly, each of these examples
demonstrates a tendency of applicants in the sample to downplay their
accomplishments or attribute them to external and systemic forces beyond
their control. This is not altogether surprising, given anecdotal evidence
that lawyers display high rates of impostor syndrome.63 It may also reect
what intelligence and maturity have shown them to be true: that one is the
product of her cumulative experiences and is shaped and helped by those
with whom she interacts. However, given lawyers’ privileged educational
and socioeconomic backgrounds, it is not obvious that humility would
gure as palpably in the questionnaires of would-be judges as it does.

57. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Warren B. Milman’s Questionnaire
(3 November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
warrenbmilmansquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/TQ4F-YRSG] [Milman’s Questionnaire].
58. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Michele H. Hollins’s Questionnaire
(31 March 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_
justicemichelehhollinssquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/GG96-DPAK] [Hollins’s Questionnaire].
59. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Shaun S. Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire
(11 May 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/05/the_honourable_
justiceshaunsnakatsurusquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/JS4X-XWMF] [Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire].
60. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Ritu Khullar’s Questionnaire
(19 April 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/03/the_honourable_
justiceritukhullarsquestionnaire0.html> [perma.cc/7JAP-P6VS] [Khullar’s Questionnaire].
61. See Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 at para 157, 212 AR 237 (SCC).
62. Paciocco’s Questionnaire, supra note 29.
63. See e.g. Mark Herrmann, “Impostor Syndrome: They’ll Figure Out That You’re Not Really That
Smart,” Above the Law (1 May 2017), online: <abovethelaw.com/2017/05/impostor-syndrome-theyllgure-out-that-youre-not-really-that-smart> [perma.cc/U2LG-WBVX].
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One cannot explain this exceptionally high incidence of humility in
the questionnaires without accounting for the possibility that applicants
deliberately emphasize the normative traits that the government expects
in their nominees. For instance, the Ofce of the Commissioner for
Federal Judicial Affairs publishes the guidelines it gives to Judicial
Advisory Committee members online. They contain a list of 20 “personal
characteristics,” that the government desires in a judge, including—
yes—“humility.” Others include patience, honesty, common sense, tact,
integrity, empathy, and sensitivity to changing social values.64 One might
have come up with a similar list of traits on his own, but the fact that the
government discloses its interests so plainly makes the judges’ tendency
to refer to these characteristics and the government’s decision to publish
their applications as a gesture toward transparency less meaningful.
This is not to suggest that the applicants who evoke humility do so
disingenuously, but the fact that they do so in a context where the trait is
preset as normatively valuable by the government casts a shadow on the
signicance of an applicant’s decision to highlight her humility at all. Put
differently, if an applicant had to answer the questionnaire without a hint
from the government about what it was looking for, then how she chose to
use her limited space—what she chose to talk about or not—would disclose
more about her character than the existing application can. That does not
mean the questionnaire would exist in a vacuum. Applicants could still
resort to the considerable literature on what distinguishes good judging
from bad.65 But this would at least do more to distinguish between judges
who formed an independent conclusion on judicial virtues and those that
merely appealed to what the government had pre-ordained. In this way,
releasing judges’ applications is not as meaningful of a step toward judicial
accountability as the government would lead one to believe because the
answers predictably, albeit imperfectly, mirror the assessment criteria that
were already made public.
4. How law and justice develop: practice, principle, and recognition
While the questionnaires are not as meaningful as they could be, neither
are they meaningless. Question 1 asked applicants what they would
regard as their “most signicant contribution to the law and the pursuit of
justice in Canada.” It is fair to ask what discussing one’s accomplishments
as a lawyer has to do with the role of the judiciary. The connection is
64. JAC Guidelines, supra note 12 at Appendix A.
65. See e.g. Jonathan Soeharno, The Integrity of the Judge: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cornwall:
Ashgate Publishing, 2009). Or, for a different take on the traits of a virtuous judge, see Ronald KL
Collins & David M Skover, The Judge: 26 Machiavellian Lessons (New York: Oxford UP, 2017).
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not immediately obvious. However, what applicants see as their most
signicant contributions to the law and the pursuit of justice reveals two
things about how they imagine the role of the judiciary. First, it gives
an idea of how (i.e. by what means) they believe the law and justice are
advanced and, second, it hints at what they view as the ends or objects
of justice. As a result, their answers anticipate the kinds of arguments or
litigants to which they may be more or less sympathetic in court.
Answers in the study sample vary in accordance with the unique
work and life experiences of the individual applicants, but they all fall
into roughly one of three categories: practice-based, principle-based, and
recognition-based contributions to the law and justice. Although most
applicants listed multiple contributions that they made, many singled out
one as their “most signicant,” responding to the question prompt. Table
4 attempts to classify each applicant’s most signicant contribution, based
on signals in the applicant’s own language, as one of three types. Where
applicants did not distinguish between the relative signicance of one
or more of their contributions, their categorization reects the dominant
theme of their answers.
Table 4: Judicial Applicants’ Most Signicant Contributions
to the Law and Justice by Dominant Type
Practice-based
Clements
Hollins
Khullar
Swartz
Bell

Principle-based
deWit
Slawinsky
Nakatsuru
Gomery

Recognition-based
Moore
Paciocco
Milman
Mayer
Brundrett
Riley
Pentney

Practice-based contributions were second-most commonly cited by
applicants in the study sample. Applicants express their practice-based
contributions in different ways, but they all reect a belief that the law and
justice are most signicantly advanced through the day-to-day practice of
law, no matter how small the client or how big the retainer. In this sense,
these answers treat the ordinary as extraordinary and, in some cases, cut
the truly extraordinary down to size. In all cases, they emphasize and exalt
the practitioner’s problem-solving skills and client service, regardless of
whether the lawyer earns professional recognition and praise for his work.
For example, Justice Swartz confronts and lionizes her own averageness
as a sole family law practitioner in Ontario:
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My most signicant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice in
Canada occurs in my daily interaction with members of the public, those
who are interacting with the justice system. There is not one isolated
thing that I have done. I have not argued at the Supreme Court. I have
not appealed to the Court of Appeal. I have not made the front page as
counsel in a notorious case. I help people with difcult problems.66

But not all applicants who subscribe to the school of practice-based
contributions are so condent. Some feel a need to defend their answer,
sensing that it might not be signicant enough to win the approval of the
Minister or the Judicial Advisory Committee. For instance, Justice Hollins
admitted that she second-guessed her response:
My most signicant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice in
Canada is doing my job. That was my immediate answer on rst seeing
this question, followed by days of deliberation, certain that something
more inspirational was expected. However, the more thought I have
given to this question, the more certain I am of my original answer.
My job could be described as fairly limited in scope; I do a variety of
civil and commercial litigation with a focus on employment law. My
clients include mid[-] to large-size companies but are far more often
small companies and individuals, primarily employees. Whoever or
whatever they are, they have a problem or a question about their legal
rights and obligations arising from a particular set of circumstances in
which they have found themselves. Their particular facts may be similar
but are always, inevitably, unique.67

Unlike Swartz, Hollins had no shortage of professional achievements that
she could have cited as her most signicant contribution, including her
tenure as national president of the Canadian Bar Association. That she
chose not to reects the formative inuence of her experience in legal
practice and the relatively equal moral value she places on all of her clients,
who she treats as ends in themselves, echoing the best traditions of Kant.
Justice Khullar would approve, having reduced her own most signicant
contribution to being a lawyer who “shows up.”68 In other words, for
her and other practice-based contributors like her, the content and the
consequences of a lawyer’s representation are less important to advancing
the law and justice than the act of representation itself. According to this
view, the fact that Justice Khullar participated in the case establishing a
66. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Deborah Swartz’s Questionnaire
(7 April 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/04/the_honourable_
justicedeborahswartzsquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/U89E-LCGF] [Swartz’s Questionnaire].
67. Hollins’s Questionnaire, supra note 58.
68. Khullar’s Questionnaire, supra note 60.
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constitutional right to strike69 is as signicant to the advancement of law
and justice as one of Justice Swartz’s routine child custody hearings. The
public might doubt that assessment, but the appointment of applicants who
emphasized their practice-based contributions suggests that the Minister
and the Judicial Advisory Committees share this respect for the virtues of
daily practice.
To be fair, practice-, principle-, and recognition-based contributions
are not mutually exclusive. “Doing the job” of a lawyer well necessarily
requires acting with principle. The questionnaire of Justice deWit, a former
criminal defence lawyer, shows how applicants straddled the line between
a practice- and principle-based contribution. For instance, he says:
…my most signicant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice
in Canada is to uphold the principles of our system on a daily basis for
the past 20 years. […] I believe that…I have been a positive asset to the
administration of justice by working hard to uphold the rule of law and
the laws of the land, and that this is my greatest contribution to the law
and the pursuit of justice.70

This answer demonstrates the link between principle and practice.
Although deWit’s response places a greater emphasis on the laws, norms,
and principles of the legal system, it was through his legal practice
and teaching that he achieved that end. But whereas the practice-based
contributors see cases and clients as ends in themselves, the principlebased contributor sees them as serving a greater good. Justice Nakatsuru
typies this attitude among the applicants. For example, he writes, “My
most signicant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice is not a
single case I tried or appealed, a decision that I wrote, or a legal ability
I may possess. Stripped to its essence, I believe it is my ardent passion
to do what I can to remedy injustice whenever and wherever I see it.”71
In this way, principle-based contributions hold out the adherence to one
or more moral principles—in Nakatsuru’s case, remedying injustice by
“eschew[ing] more lucrative areas of practice” to ght for individual
rights—as the most important vehicle for propelling the interests of law
and justice forward. For Justice Gomery, that means not simply serving
clients but assuming a leadership role and doing what will have “the most
impact on the greatest number of people.”72

69. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245.
70. deWit’s Questionnaire, supra note 47.
71. Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire, supra note 59.
72. Gomery’s Questionnaire, supra note 49.
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By contrast, recognition-based contributions to law and justice
differ from both practice- and principle-based contributions in that they
attribute the greatest signicance to one or more of a lawyer’s specic
accomplishments. These include particular cases tried, clients represented,
or jobs performed that have earned them praise from their family, friends,
peers, or other inuential people. For example, Justice Mayer said his most
signicant contribution to the law and the pursuit of justice was the role he
played as the lead negotiator for the Prince Rupert Port Authority, reaching
and then implementing impact and benets agreements with ve of the six
Tsimshian First Nations in British Columbia.73 Similarly, Justice Brundrett
cited his work as a Crown prosecutor on one case that was afrmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada, R v Knott,74 as his greatest contribution. He
used Question 1 to describe the state of the law both before and after that
case, the effect of which was to increase a judge’s exibility to sentence
a repeat offender to probation instead of incarceration.75 By pointing to a
particular praiseworthy accomplishment, as opposed to a general practice
or principle, these applicants appeal to the Minister and Judicial Advisory
Committees’ own privilege. Although three of the seven members on each
committee may be members of the public, the other four are representatives
of elite organizations: the law society, the Canadian Bar Association, a
province’s Court of Appeal, and the provincial Attorney General.76 As a
result, the Minister and the Judicial Advisory Committees are likely to nd
candidates who have already achieved honours or elite status (i.e. people
like them) more relatable and arguably better suited to the judicial role
than those who have not. Recognition-based contributions also highlight
the undeniable connection between the pursuit of justice and the need to
persuade other actors in society—usually governments, judges, and other
elites—to adopt one’s vision of the Good. Without recognition, one’s
idea of the Good can have only a limited effect on the law, which might
explain why recognition-based contributions were popular among judicial
applicants in this study.
The practice, principle, and recognition distinction latent in these
applicants’ questionnaires repeats and reinforces conventional beliefs

73. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Andrew P. Mayer’s Questionnaire
(3 November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
andrewpmayersquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/E9YV-G8FL] [Mayer’s Questionnaire].
74. R v Knott, 2010 BCCA 386, 291 BCAC 236, aff’d 2012 SCC 42, [2012] 2 SCR 470.
75. See Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Michael J. Brundrett’s Questionnaire
(3 November 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/11/the_honourable_
michaeljbrundrettsquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/LFE8-F8NG].
76. JAC Guidelines, supra note 12 at “Composition.”
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about the proper role of a judge in Canadian society. Just as stare decisis
compels judges to follow principles set by higher courts, the primacy
of statute over the common law usually requires judges to enforce rules
enacted by democratically elected legislators. In this context, where
judges often take their cues from someone else, it is logical that aspiring
judges would tend to over-emphasize those of their contributions based
on practice and external recognition. Law students are routinely taught
that the “Good Judge” in a common law system is one who follows
precedent, who knows his place in the system, who defers to Parliament
as appropriate, who avoids developing the common law more than
incrementally, and whose decisions are upheld on appeal. When he does
these things, the Good Judge earns the respect of his equally conservative
colleagues on the bench and the recognition of higher courts. Whether
he applies constitutional, statutory, or common law norms, superior and
federal court judges are rarely called upon to establish new principles and,
even when they are, they can almost always be derived by reference to
higher, subsisting morals.77 As such, most of the applicants in this study’s
sample merely did what Good Judges are expected to do: they extolled the
virtues of practice, following professional norms and legal rules prescribed
by law societies and governments, and they pointed to specic times when
others recognized them for a job well done.
The problem with this pattern is that it betrays the essential importance
of principle to judicial selection and decision-making. For instance, Allan
Hutchinson argues that it is “misleading and inaccurate” to describe judges
as umpires who apply xed legal rules to new facts. By picking which rule
to apply, dening what it means, and interpreting how it is applied, judges
are inevitably entangled in a political and contestable exercise: “law is
politics by other means.”78 Put differently, embracing the role of the Good
Judge is as much a political act as outing its precepts. So, it makes sense
that the Minister and Judicial Advisory Committees should enquire into an
applicant’s political ideology to help inform the judicial selection process.
This ideological investigation does not politicize the judiciary because the
judiciary is already inescapably political.79 Viewed through this lens, the
Trudeau government’s commitment to appointing diverse candidates itself
77. I use “morals” in the political sense, as synonymous with normative principles, ends, or goods.
78. Allan Hutchinson, “Looking for the Good Judge: Merit and Ideology” in Nadia Verrelli, ed, The
Democratic Dilemma: Reforming Canada’s Supreme Court (Toronto: McGill–Queen’s UP, 2013) 99
at 103, 107. See also Lorne Sossin, “Judicial Appointment, Democratic Aspiration and the Culture of
Accountability” (2008) 58 UNB LJ 11 at 13; Douglas E Edlin, Common Law Judging: Subjectivity,
Impartiality and the Making of Law (Ann Arbor: U Mich Press, 2016) at 110.
79. Hutchinson, supra note 78 at 109.
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represents a progressive liberal ideology about the kinds of attributes that
are or are not relevant to good judging and to boosting public condence
in the judiciary. For example, if there were a positive relationship between
the visual representativeness (e.g. gender and racial composition) of the
judiciary and public condence among those under-represented groups in
society, then one would expect public condence in the justice system to
be highest among whites and lowest among visible minorities. However,
that is not the case. According to Statistics Canada, public condence
in the courts was highest among visible minorities and immigrants in
2013, with 74 per cent of them reporting condence in the justice system,
compared to just 56 points for non-immigrants. Public condence was also
higher among women than men.80 This does not suggest that diversity is
an unworthy goal. Rather, it suggests that, as a goal, it is directed to some
political end or vision of a just society. Applicants who cited principlebased contributions as their most signicant gave the government some
sense of their vision for a just society. The fact that many others did not
demonstrates the risks inherent in role morality and leaves something to
be desired in the design of the questionnaire if it is to be more than a
tokenistic exercise in accountability.
5. Diversity is good (and vague)
Question 2 asks applicants to describe how their experience has provided
them with “insight into the variety and diversity of Canadians and their
unique perspectives.” Questions 1 and 2 are similar in that they each
posit an unqualied good. In Question 1, it is justice. In Question 2,
it is diversity. Just as Question 1 left justice undened and open to the
applicant’s denition, Question 2 does not dene what the government
means by “diversity.” As a result, the answers reect a broad range of
perspectives, both on what dimensions of Canada’s diversity are relevant
to the judicial role and how one comes to develop an appreciation of that
diversity. Yet, again, there are recurring themes. For example, Justices Bell
and Clements gave examples of their formal education in diversity and
cultural competence. Justices deWit, Slawinsky, Milman, and Nakatsuru
wrote about the diversity of their clients (rich and poor, English-speaking
and not, etc.) and how this has given them a better appreciation of the
different life experiences people have faced. Meanwhile, Justices Hollins
and Pentney emphasized the diversity of other lawyers and stakeholders
80. Adam Cotter, “Public Condence in Canadian Institutions” (7 December 2015) at 5, online
(pdf): Statistics Canada <www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-652-x/89-652-x2015007-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/
YUR3-B5VG]. Where public condence falls short is among Indigenous Peoples: 15 per cent fewer
Indigenous Peoples had condence in the justice system than non-Indigenous Peoples.
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with whom they have worked.81 Still others like Justice Brundrett, a former
Crown prosecutor in Vancouver’s downtown eastside, a neighbourhood
notorious for its crime, drugs, and poverty, pointed to the economic, social,
racial, and linguistic diversity of their opposing parties and witnesses.82
Few pointed to their own membership in a minority group, but of those
who did, most are white men: Justice deWit spoke about being a foreignspeaking immigrant from Holland, Justice Milman noted his Jewish
identity, and Justice Paciocco said he was sometimes treated “differently”
growing up in an Italian Canadian family. Of the three visible minorities
in the sample—Justices Khullar, Mayer, and Nakatsuru—only two spoke
of their difference as an asset. Justice Khullar, a native-born Canadian of
East Indian heritage, did not mention it at all in Question 2 and brought it
up in the optional Question 6 only to dismiss it: “[M]y parents raised us to
be ‘Canadian; full stop’. That is how I view myself.”83
Travel was the most popular way applicants in the sample acquired
some or all of their ideas on diversity.84 Justice Bell recounted her
experience living and working in regions across Canada, including the
Yukon Territory. In a somewhat bizarre aside, she expressed her regret
at not having visited the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, vowing to
visit both “next summer.”85 Comments like these are problematic for two
reasons. First, they risk treating diversity as a checklist of places to go and
people to meet, trivializing the depth of experience that the judicial role
requires. Second, the emphasis that applicants in this study place on travel
is a reminder that even the poorest among them come from relatively
privileged means. Many of the people they will be judging could not
afford to travel as extensively as they have, and, in that sense, one might
ask whether these judges are as diverse as the government would have one
believe.
Then again, many of the applicants’ answers demonstrate that one
need not belong to a socioeconomic minority to know the importance
81. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice William F. Pentney’s Questionnaire
(7
December
2018),
online:
<www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2018/12/thehonourablewilliam-f-pentneysquestionnaire.html>
[perma.cc/WSA8-56V7]
[Pentney’s
Questionnaire].
82. See also Paciocco’s Questionnaire, supra note 29, and Riley’s Questionnaire, supra note 44.
83. Khullar’s Questionnaire, supra note 60.
84. See e.g. Moore’s Questionnaire, supra note 42; deWit’s Questionnaire, supra note 47; Milman’s
Questionnaire, supra note 57; Hollins’s Questionnaire, supra note 58; Nakatsuru’s Questionnaire,
supra note 59; Swartz’s Questionnaire, supra note 66; Mayer’s Questionnaire, supra note 73; Pentney’s
Questionnaire, supra note 81; Bell’s Questionnaire, infra note 85.
85. Canada, Department of Justice, The Honourable Justice Robyn M. Ryan Bell’s Questionnaire
(5 May 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/05/the_honourable_
justicerobynmryanbellsquestionnaire.html> [perma.cc/FY33-VRKW] [Bell’s Questionnaire].
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of diverse perspectives. Justice Paciocco described his own insight into
Canadians’ diversity as follows:
If you want to see diversity, go to a provincial courthouse. […] Being
a provincial court judge is an immersion in the world of poverty,
homelessness and mental illness. In Ottawa, it is a veritable baptism
in the challenges faced by Aboriginals, most pervasively, Inuit people
plagued by alcoholism and displacement, often stranded far from the
north after having come here for medical reasons. I see these people
in their worst moments, sometimes shackled, but always bowed and
humiliated and hurting. Often sick, always in need. It is impossible not
to be affected by this. One would have to be blind not to see the diversity
of our communities, and heartless not to crave solutions to inequality
and excessive use of the criminal law. And one would have to be obtuse
to believe we are all equally responsible for who we are, or to fail to
recognize that justice means different things to different people—that
the power of the law has to be wielded differently, for different people.86

One would have to be mindless not to recognize that these words
demonstrate insight into the judicial role. Justice Paciocco powerfully
conveys empathy toward Indigenous peoples and a certain conviction that
the situation they nd themselves in is morally indefensible. Examples
like this are poignant proof that releasing the questionnaires of federal
appointees can in fact boost the condence in the judiciary of those who
read them.
Yet, consistent with the theme that not all answers are created equally,
a few applicants made bald assertions that do nothing to demonstrate
insight or to improve public condence. For example, in her otherwise
unimpeachable application, Justice Slawinsky claims that she has “no
biases of which [she] is aware.”87 Justice deWit similarly suggests he is
“open minded and not prejudiced towards anyone based on race, culture,
sexual orientation or gender.”88 The problem with these statements is that
all humans, including judges, have biases and prejudices. That an applicant
is not aware of them makes them more, not less, pernicious. By listing four
grounds on which he claims no prejudice, deWit invites the reader to imagine
all the other grounds on which he might consciously or unconsciously be
prejudiced. Thus, so long as these questionnaires continue to be released,
applicants should take greater care to avoid unfortunate remarks that could
lead to public embarrassment or misunderstanding. The misadventures of
Justice Eidsvik make this much plain.
86. Paciocco’s Questionnaire, supra note 29.
87. Slawinsky’s Questionnaire, supra note 45.
88. deWit’s Questionnaire, supra note 47.
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The net result of the responses to Question 2 is to give the reader
condence that the appointees in the sample generally value diverse
perspectives. However, the appointees are decidedly non-diverse in their
shared celebration of diversity. This lack of ideological diversity is to
be expected for four reasons. First, as discussed, applicants will appeal
to the government’s political values to curry favour with the decisionmakers responsible for their appointment. Second, the Minister and the
Judicial Advisory Committees will generally prefer to appoint judges who
share the government’s political values than those who do not. Third, a
lawyer’s training inculcates applicants with certain values and views that
reinforce existing institutional arrangements, producing professionals with
relatively homogenous worldviews.89 Fourth, the concept of diversity is so
vague as to be virtually unassailable. It can mean whatever the applicant
wants it to mean. For example, Sonia Lawrence ridicules a “diverse”
bench as unworkable, preferring to endorse the idea of a bench that reects
the community it serves.90 The answers to the Questionnaire for Federal
Judicial Appointments go to prove Lawrence’s intuition: even though
13 of the 16 judges in this study t the mould of the “white judge,” and
seven are white men, no charitable interpretation of their questionnaires
could lead one to conclude that they lack diversity. On the contrary, their
responses demonstrate a diversity of life experience and encounters with
perspectives unlike their own, both when one views their questionnaires
in comparison and in isolation. Therefore, ironically, the ercest argument
against the need for more visible diversity on the bench could come from
the Liberal government’s own publication of appointees’ answers to the
Questionnaire.
6. A reasonable apprehension of “bees”?
Lastly, publishing successful judges’ applications raises a serious question
about whether their comments could create a reasonable apprehension of
bias and thereby undermine judicial independence. For instance, Justice
Swartz described how an excursion to Nicaragua to take a beekeeping
course exposed her to diverse perspectives:
As a farmer and beekeeper from so far away, it was uplifting and
empowering to engage with a group of people so focused on developing
a community unaffected by geography, gender or ethnicity and connected
by our common passion. Our group was a global community. We spoke
three different languages, came from many different countries, were
89. Sonia Lawrence, “Reections on Diversity and Judicial Independence” in Adam M Dodek &
Lorne Sossin, eds, Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 202.
90. Ibid.
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different genders and were aged from 18 to 60. Many questions were
asked about Canada’s system of government and justice. Questions
about the challenges faced by our First Nations people and why Canada
has been slow to open and maintain effective dialogue, in particular
around environmental and land rights, were difcult to explain. Our lack
of clean drinking water in First Nations communities was something that
I discussed with great shame and no reasonable explanation.91

Justice Swartz’s comments are in line with the Liberal government’s
diversity paradigm, but they also reveal an unfavourable assessment of
Canada’s treatment of Indigenous peoples. With a growing population
of First Nations and decades of legal developments since the formal
recognition of Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the Charter, it is not
inconceivable that Justice Swartz could one day nd herself adjudicating a
rights claim between First Nations and the government, or by a group asking
the court to read a right to a healthy environment into the Charter.92 The
ability to search for details about a judge’s life on websites like Google has
lowered the cost for litigants to nd potentially damaging information that
they can use to shop for judges.93 Now, with the advent of posting judicial
applications online, the government contributes to the trove of publicly
available data about members of the bench, which could come back to bite
them. In such cases, it is fair to ask whether exposing comments like these
to public view could create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the right
case and, if so, whether posting judges’ applications online today is not
worth the risk of undermining judicial independence tomorrow.
This is a live concern, but it is overstated. Even accepting that Justice
Swartz has an actual bias in favour of Aboriginal or environmental
rights claimants (and it is not clear she does), that does not automatically
disqualify her from hearing a case involving such subjects. As Justice
Cory held in R v S (RD),94 writing for the majority on this point:
The requirement for neutrality does not require judges to discount the
very life experiences that may so well qualify them to preside over
disputes. It has been observed that the duty to be impartial
does not mean that a judge does not, or cannot bring to the bench
many existing sympathies, antipathies or attitudes. There is no
91. Swartz’s Questionnaire, supra note 66 [emphasis added].
92. See e.g. Kimberly Shearon & Margot Venton, “The Right to a Healthy Environment: Canada’s
Time to Act” (2015), online (pdf): Ecojustice <ecojustice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Right_
to_a_healthy_environment_FINAL.pdf> [perma.cc/F679-AR97].
93. Karen Eltis, Courts, Litigants and the Digital Age: Law, Ethics and Practice (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2012) at 75.
94. R v S (RD), [1997] 3 SCR 484, 161 NSR (2d) 241 (SCC).
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human being who is not the product of every social experience,
every process of education, and every human contact with those
with whom we share the planet. Indeed, even if it were possible,
a judge free of this heritage of past experience would probably
lack the very qualities of humanity required of a judge. Rather,
the wisdom required of a judge is to recognize, consciously
allow for, and perhaps to question, all the baggage of past
attitudes and sympathies that fellow citizens are free to carry,
untested, to the grave.
True impartiality does not require that the judge have no
sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless
be free to entertain and act upon different points of view with
an open mind.95

In that case, the court held that a black judge was entitled to take her
own life experience into account in concluding that a white police ofcer
probably overreacted in his aggressive treatment of a black teen. That
she did so would not have led “an informed person, viewing the matter
realistically and practically—and having thought the matter through—”
to conclude the judge would not decide fairly.96 Thus, the burden to
establish a reasonable apprehension of bias is high.97 The mere fact that
Justice Swartz is sympathetic to the plight of Indigenous peoples does
not necessarily preclude her from fairly adjudicating a case involving
Aboriginal claims. It is always possible to imagine a hypothetical scenario
in which comments in one context could take on new meaning in another.
But, now that the government has set a precedent for releasing them,
blocking the publication of judicial appointees’ questionnaires would do
more to undermine public condence in the judiciary today than would
some speculative allegation of bias in the future.
III. On transparency and priorities
Whatever the utility of publishing the applications of federally appointed
judges, the government’s delay in releasing the excerpts to the public
raises doubt about the strength if not the sincerity of the government’s
commitment to accountability and transparency in judicial selection. In
his 2015 mandate letter to the Minister of Justice, Jody Wilson-Raybould,
Trudeau characterized openness as a top priority for his government:

95. Ibid at para 119.
96. Ibid at para 111.
97. See also Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (AG), 2015 SCC 25 at
paras 26, 30-34, 55, 61, [2015] 2 SCR 282.
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It is time to shine more light on government to ensure it remains focused
on the people it serves. Government and its information should be open
by default. If we want Canadians to trust their government, we need a
government that trusts Canadians. It is important that we acknowledge
mistakes when we make them. Canadians do not expect us to be perfect—
they expect us to be honest, open, and sincere in our efforts to serve the
public interest.
[…]
You are expected to do your part to fulll our government’s commitment
to transparent, merit-based appointments, to help ensure gender parity
and that Indigenous Canadians and minority groups are better reected
in positions of leadership.98

That Trudeau published this letter at all—a rst for any prime minister—
seemed to signal a genuine willingness to govern differently than his
predecessors. Yet, despite repeated promises by the government that
excerpts from each judicial application “will be available shortly,” the
vast majority remain unpublished. The government undertook to publish
excerpts for 89 of its 100 judicial appointments in 2017, but as of 1 January
2020, it still had not published excerpts for 73 of them.
Figure 1: Length of delay between a judge’s appointment
to the bench and publication of his or her questionnaire
(in number of days)
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98. Letter from Justin Trudeau to Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould (2 November 2015),
online: Ofce of the Prime Minister <pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-justice-and-attorney-general-canadamandate-letter> [perma.cc/F4EY-X8WR] [Mandate Letter].
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What is worse is that the time between a candidate’s appointment and
the release of his application has increased drastically with successive
nominations. Figure 1 illustrates the number of days it took the government
to publish a judge’s application for the 16 justices appointed in 2017
whose questionnaires are available, in order of their appointment. Note
how the rst ten questionnaires were all released within one month of their
respondents’ appointments. Three were released on the same day and another
four were published within one week. By contrast, the six applications
published most recently were delayed by 4 to 18 months each. As of
1 January 2020, British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice John Hunter had
the longest outstanding questionnaire; he was appointed 994 days earlier
on 12 April 2017. Applications for the last judges named to the bench in
2017, a spate of eight appointed on 19 December, were 743 days past due.
Given the government’s interest in administrative expediency and the dire
need to ll judicial vacancies in many parts of the country,99 it might be
unreasonable to expect applications to be released concurrently with all
candidates’ appointments; however, it is disingenuous for the government
to say they will be released “shortly” when that has not been its practice in
any meaningful sense. “Shortly” is vague, but it is not empty. A few months
could be short; surely, two-and-a-half years is not. It is no accident that the
rst ten applications released by the government belong to 10 of the rst
12 judges to be appointed under the Liberals’ new process.100 This suggests
that the government was eager to burnish its transparency credentials early
on by putting its promise to publish judicial applications into practice; but,
having already proven its readiness to release this information in principle,
which no previous government had ever bothered to do, the government
apparently does not see the need to follow its own precedent—at least, not
with any sense of urgency. And therein lies the rub: because the obligation
to release this information is political, rather than legal, the government
may drag its feet with impunity, unless the obligation to disclose judicial
applications is codied in statute.
Using access to information legislation is one option to hasten the
records’ release, but it has not proven to be effective. For example, the
Department of Justice found that “no records exist[ed]”101 in response to
99. See e.g. Monique Scotti, “Alberta judicial appointments ‘imminent’ amid renewed calls to action,”
Global News (3 April 2018), online: <globalnews.ca/news/4120154/alberta-judicial-appointmentsimminent-after-renewed-calls-to-action> [perma.cc/JF8N-SXGC]. Adding to the urgency was the
prospect that hundreds of stale criminal charges would be stayed following the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631, which set presumptive deadlines
for the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.
100. See Appendix A.
101. Letter from Francine Farley, Coordinator, Access to Information and Privacy Division,
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a 13 October 2017 request that it disclose questionnaires “for all judges
appointed by the federal government [in 2017] to the Federal Court,
Federal Court of Appeal, all Superior Courts and Courts of Appeal of
the provinces” under the Access to Information Act.102 This seemed to be
a bizarre answer, given that the Department’s letter dated 8 November
2017 came only ve days after it had posted questionnaires for Justices
Brundrett, Gomery, Mayer, and Milman on 3 November, as indicated by
the timestamp on those pages of the Department’s website. However, a
subsequent investigation by the Ofce of the Information Commissioner
of Canada103 claried that the Department offers only policy analysis when
changes are proposed to the appointment process and “does not play a direct
role in the federal judicial appointment process,” which is coordinated
by the Minister of Justice and the Commissioner for Federal Judicial
Affairs.104 Conveniently, neither the Minister’s nor the Commissioner’s
ofce is directly subject to the Access to Information Act.105
The Commissioner’s ofce might be immune to disclosure
requirements, but the Minister’s ofce is not. In Canada (Information
Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence),106 an eightmember majority of the Supreme Court held that, although a cabinet
minister’s ofce is not “part” of the Department she manages, one may
summon records physically held in her ofce if they are legally “under the
control” of the Department.107 To suggest otherwise would effectively turn
the minister’s ofce into a “black hole” for sheltering sensitive records.108
Accordingly, courts will apply a two-step test to determine whether a
record is under a department’s control:
• rst, does the record relate to a “departmental matter”; and
• second, could a senior department ofcial reasonably expect to
obtain a copy of the record upon request?
The second step is an objective test that must consider all relevant factors,
including “the substantive content of the record, the circumstances in
which it was created, and the legal relationship between the government
Department of Justice Canada to Agathon Fric (8 November 2017).
102. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1, s 4(1).
103. I led Complaint #3217-01953 with the Commissioner on 4 January 2018 under the Access to
Information Act, supra note 102, s 31.
104. Letter from Normand Sirois, Investigator, Ofce of the Information Commissioner of Canada to
Agathon Fric (27 March 2018) [emphasis in original].
105. See Access to Information Act, supra note 102, s 3, “government institution,” (a) and Schedule I;
Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25 at para
43, [2011] 2 SCR 306 [National Defence].
106. National Defence, supra note 105.
107. Ibid at paras 28, 43.
108. Ibid at para 52.
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institution and the record holder.”109 The Court emphasized that there is
no presumption that records in a minister’s ofce are inaccessible.110 It
follows that political records are not exempt from disclosure per se, but the
majority seemed to accept that political records will often fall outside the
control of the department because ministers’ ofces are not “government
institutions” under the Act.111 Indeed, the fact a document was created by
exempt (i.e. political) staff in a minister’s ofce and possessed solely by
them seems to have been dispositive of the issue in that case.112
More recently, in Yeager v Canada (Minister of Public Safety),113 the
Federal Court rejected a researcher’s bid to obtain papers on which the
Minister of Public Safety relied in appointing members to an independent
review panel of Correctional Service Canada (CSC). Yeager’s mistake was
to request the information from the Department of Public Safety, which had
no control over CSC’s records relating to the independent panel. The Court
reasoned that “[w]hile National Defence was concerned with whether a
government institution has control of a record in a Minister’s ofce, the
same logic applies in determining whether a government institution has
control of a record in the possession of another government institution.”114
In other words, the mere fact that a minister is responsible for more than
one government institution does not mean that the records of one are under
the control of the other. A similar analysis would likely apply to the present
case. The completed judicial questionnaires are not created from scratch
by political staff, but the selection of judges is a fundamentally political
exercise centred in the Minister’s ofce. It is not an activity that relates to
the kind of legal or policy work that one would normally think of as being
a “departmental matter.” This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that
the appointment process ows through the Ofce of the Commissioner
for Federal Judicial Affairs, a separate, purpose-built body that Parliament
opted not to include within the Access to Information Act’s scope.
One could argue that the questionnaires relate to a departmental matter
because the applications are posted on the Department’s website, rather
than the Commissioner’s. But even if one could pass the rst step of the
control test, it is doubtful that a senior department ofcial could reasonably
expect to obtain a copy of an unpublished judicial questionnaire from
the Minister or the Commissioner upon request, particularly as they are
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Ibid at para 56.
Ibid at para 57.
Ibid at para 58.
See ibid at paras 60-63.
Yeager v Canada (Minister of Public Safety), 2017 FC 330, 279 ACWS (3d) 228.
Ibid at paras 59, 61.
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under no legal obligation to make that information public. As a result, it
is unlikely that the Access to Information Act compels the government
to follow through on a prior commitment to publish the applications of
federal judges.
Still, one should not have to beg or complain to access the judges’
applications after the government has undertaken to release them. In
addition to reforming the judicial appointments process, Trudeau instructed
the Minister to:
[w]ork with the President of the Treasury Board to enhance the
openness of government, including supporting his review of the Access
to Information Act to ensure…that the Act applies appropriately to
the Prime Minister’s and Ministers’ Ofces, as well as administrative
institutions that support…the courts.115

There are good reasons why it might not be “appropriate” to grant
wholesale access to information in Ministers’ Ofces or the Ofce of
the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. Ministers are reasonably
entitled to a zone of privacy in which they can conduct the difcult and
stressful business of managing the country’s affairs without fear of constant
scrutiny. However, if the government is as committed to accountability
and transparency in judicial appointments as it claims to be, then there is
no reason why judges’ applications should not be subject to the Act’s right
of access, which already contains provisions to safeguard judges’ most
sensitive personal information.
According to the Minister’s ofce, the problem is not a question
of commitment but of law and resources.116 David Taylor, Director of
Communications in the Ofce of the Minister of Justice and Attorney
General, cites two reasons for the delay. First, he says, the Privacy Act117
and the application form require the government to obtain the jurist’s
consent before it may publish his questionnaire. Second, after the judge
has consented to his application’s release, staff must redact personal
information, convert le formats, and translate the questionnaires. Taylor
says this “labour-intensive and time-consuming” work is performed by

115. Mandate Letter, supra note 98 [emphasis added].
116. Requests that the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, Marc Giroux, voluntarily disclose
what the government had already publicly undertaken to publish were rst ignored and then redirected
to the Minister’s ofce: Letter from Agathon Fric to Marc Giroux (18 November 2017); Letter from
Natalie Duranleau, Executive Assistant to the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs to Agathon
Fric (23 January 2018).
117. Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21.
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only two people in the Minister’s ofce who do not receive administrative
support from the Department of Justice.118
Neither explanation offers a compelling reason to delay disclosure.
First, while it is true that the application form indicates “[t]he nominee will
be asked to consent to the release of any personal information…prior to its
release,” the form also declares the government’s intention to make that
information public: “if a candidate is chosen, [then]…it is intended that
at that time the personal information, including information on diversity,
and information contained in PARTS 6 and 7 of this Questionnaire is to
be disclosed to the public.”119 Given the application’s express wording and
the emphasis this government has placed on opening the selection process
to scrutiny, one could argue that the publication of a judge’s questionnaire
should be construed as a condition of appointment. This construction is
supported by the government’s use of the words “at that time,” which
implies that the government intended the information should be released
once a candidate is selected. In this sense, it was unnecessary for the
government to include the line promising to ask for the nominee’s consent.
Having given clear notice to prospective applicants of the government’s
intention to publish the questionnaire if their application succeeded, it
is hard to imagine how a judge who accepts the appointment could then
reasonably withhold consent. But even assuming that consent could not
be implied, the consent issue is a red herring. By Taylor’s own admission,
as of 25 October 2017, no judge had objected to the publication of his
application.120 Insisting on the nominees’ consent at a later stage might
have been a way to induce applicants to answer the questionnaire candidly
or to encourage people to apply who otherwise might not have if they knew
their personal information had to be published. These are valid concerns.
But, on one hand, it is doubtful that this qualication would change an
applicant’s answers so signicantly as to warrant the limitation and, on the
other, it raises questions about the wisdom of appointing a judge who does
not share the government’s commitment to accountability.
Moreover, it is not clear that the Privacy Act requires the Minister’s
ofce to obtain the judges’ consent after the fact. For example, subsection
8(1) prohibits a government institution from disclosing personal
information without the subject’s consent. However, subsection 8(2)
establishes a list of exceptions to the rule:
118. Cristin Schmitz, “Liberals fail to deliver on pledge to publish excerpts ‘shortly’ from applications
for bench,” The Lawyer’s Daily (25 October 2017), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/4993>
[perma.cc/2RT5-MNXK].
119. Questionnaire, supra note 28 [emphasis added].
120. Schmitz, supra note 118.
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Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the
control of a government institution may be disclosed
(a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or
compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that
purpose;
(b)

for any purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or
any regulation made thereunder that authorizes its disclosure;
[…]

The Liberals’ reformed Questionnaire serves dual purposes—one
administrative and specic, the other democratic and general. First, it serves
an immediate need to help Judicial Advisory Committees and the Minister
of Justice make recommendations for appointment. Second, it enables
scrutiny of a candidate’s suitability for judicial ofce by the Committees,
the Minister, and Canadians more broadly. Although one could circumvent
the Privacy Act’s protections by dening the purpose of the data collection
at increasing levels of generality, it is not such a stretch to suggest that
publishing judges’ applications online to promote judicial accountability is
“the purpose for which the information was obtained or…a use consistent
with that purpose,” especially given the government’s express words
on the form. Alternatively, section 8(2)(b) gives the governing Liberals
another way to make good on their transparency promise—that is, to
pass legislation requiring the government to release the applications of
successful candidates, notwithstanding the individual’s consent.
Taylor’s pragmatic concerns are likewise exaggerated. If consent is
not the big issue that he makes it out to be, then he would have one believe
that redaction, formatting, and translation account for the delay. Certainly,
judges will have answered the questionnaire in only one of the two ofcial
languages. Since all federal government information must be published in
English and French, staff would need to translate the answers. However,
staff managed to format, translate, and publish 10 of the 16 available
questionnaires within one month of those judges’ appointments, which
suggests that something other than formatting and translation is to blame
for the 24- to 34-month delays facing the 73 outstanding questionnaires.
If staff are spending that time liaising with judges to redact personal
information or augment their initial answers, then it raises the question
as to how committed the government can be to transparency in judicial
appointments if it is singly or together with recent appointees cherrypicking what parts of their answers get disclosed. Rather than remain a
mystery, judges’ proles would then represent carefully curated and thus
self-serving images of the Liberals’ appointments. There is no evidence
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that this is the case, but the idea is not as wild as it sounds. For instance,
no rules prohibit the government from modifying the questionnaires; such
modications would explain the increasingly long delays; and, when asked,
Taylor did not answer whether judges may change their questionnaires
before publication.121
Acknowledging the delay, Taylor offered assurances in 2018 that
the Minister would seek “additional help from the Department of Justice
to speed up the posting of the applications online.”122 However, as the
foregoing discussion makes clear, the Minister’s ofce has a legal interest
in not requesting the Department’s help so as to avoid embarrassing or
premature disclosure under the Access to Information Act. On that basis,
it seems unlikely the Minister ever sought additional help to pick up the
slack. Indeed, starting on 22 June 2018, scarcely 18 months after it had
begun the practice, the government quietly stopped promising to publish
the judicial applications of its new appointees—“shortly” or at all.123 Of
the 33 it did promise to release in 2018, 20 (61 per cent) had still not been
published as of 1 January 2020.124 Excerpts were available for only one
out of every three appointees from 2018 and zero appointees from 2019.125
Notably, this change in practice coincided with Wilson-Raybould’s exit
from the Department of Justice on 14 January 2019.126 News releases
announcing appointments have since tended to include more detailed
biographies of the appointees, but they lack the same quality or quantity
of information offered by the raw answers to the Questionnaire.
What this ultimately means is that releasing excerpts from the Liberals’
judicial applications is not a priority, despite the government’s rhetoric to
the contrary. In Taylor’s words: “our priority in supporting the Minister is
121. Ibid.
122. Letter from David Taylor, Director of Communications in the Ofce of the Minister of Justice
and Attorney General to Agathon Fric (9 February 2018).
123. See e.g. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada announces
judicial appointment in the province of New Brunswick” (22 June 2018), online: <www.canada.ca/
en/department-justice/news/2018/06/government-of-canada-announces-judicial-appointment-in-theprovince-of-new-brunswick1.html> [perma.cc/9PUD-SXBF]. Despite the formal reversal, Taylor
insisted the Department would continue to publish judges’ applications, which it did for 15 individuals
appointed after 22 June 2018: Cristin Schmitz, “Trudeau government breaks promise to disclose info
on new federal judges ‘shortly,’” The Lawyer’s Daily (5 July 2018), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/
articles/6882> [perma.cc/J9EM-JBDG].
124. See Appendix B.
125. See e.g. Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada announces
judicial appointment in the province of Quebec” (31 January 2019), online: <www.canada.ca/en/
department-justice/news/2019/01/government-of-canada-announces-judicial-appointment-in-theprovince-of-quebec.html> [perma.cc/3E5Y-LGYH].
126. Peter Zimonjic, “After being removed as justice minister, Wilson-Raybould defends her
performance,” CBC News (14 January 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wilson-raybouldjustice-veterans-1.4977782> [perma.cc/C2N5-WAE7].
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in making exceptional judicial appointments, which she has done. The team
is making its best efforts to clear the backlog of applications.”127 Although
making the appointments should rightly take priority over publishing their
applications, Taylor’s defence of this lackadaisical approach invites one of
three charges:
i. the questionnaires do not offer much substance, so the value of
publishing them is illusory;
ii. the questionnaires are politically benecial but the Minister has
neglected her undertaking to release them “shortly”; or
iii. the questionnaires are politically damaging and the Minister has
deliberately sought to suppress them.
That the questionnaires might be of limited value is no excuse to renege on
the government’s original promise to release them. The government loses
credibility on the transparency issue when it permits delay to overshadow
its pledge to open government. The message is clear: appoint rst and
worry about transparency later, if at all. These are not the “sunny ways”
that Trudeau promised on the night of his election128 but politics as usual.
If the current Minister, David Lametti, cared about his government’s
commitment, then he would hire additional help. He would insist that
judges’ questionnaires be displayed prominently on the Department’s
website and not buried in a press release. Put simply, he would do things
differently. Trudeau’s reforms toward openness will have been for naught
if he is ousted from ofce before establishing a new norm of judicial
accountability through the publication of federal judges’ questionnaires.
Therefore, the government’s delay in releasing the excerpts undermines
the Liberals’ transparency project. This suggests that there is room for
improvement.
Recommendations and conclusion
Answers to the Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments disclose
various interests, themes, and emotions. Although applicants express
their views of judging and justice in different ways, drawing on their own
unique anecdotes and experiences, their answers frequently exhibit insight
into the judicial role in Canada.
Of course, there are exceptions to every rule. As discussed, some
candidates did not bother to comply with the government’s requested word
range, providing short and supercial answers to otherwise compelling
127. Letter from David Taylor, supra note 122.
128. Justin Trudeau, “For the Record: A Full Transcript of Justin Trudeau’s Speech,” Maclean’s (20
October 2015), online: <www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/justin-trudeau-for-the-record-we-beatfear-with-hope> [perma.cc/ZSB2-558Y].
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questions. Many simply followed the government’s own rubric to reverseengineer answers based on stipulated assessment criteria. Ultimately,
most offered responses based on common assumptions of what “Good
Judges” are supposed to do. Together, these observations suggest that
some candidates were better qualied for judicial appointment based on
their written answers than others. This does not mean the others were
unqualied—only that their applications were demonstrably weaker in
relative terms. This signies that, as currently constituted, the Questionnaire
mostly serves as a test of conventional judicial attitudes and government
politics than as an inventory of genuinely free ideas. To that extent, its
utility as a meaningful tool for judicial accountability is suspect.
But not all hope is lost. If the federal government takes its commitment
to transparency and accountability in judicial appointments seriously—
and it should—then there are specic, measurable steps it could take
immediately to improve the quality and signicance of applicants’ answers:
a. Eliminate (minimum) word counts. Applying for federal judicial
ofce is a serious undertaking. It should not be taken lightly.
Although a longer answer will not always be superior to a
shorter one, removing word counts will give applicants an early
opportunity to demonstrate good judgment in gauging the level
of depth that a particular question warrants. If the government
retains word counts—for instance, to promote equity between
applications—then the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs
should request applicants who do not comply with the rule to
resubmit their questionnaires.
b. Ask at least one value-based question to probe a candidate’s
political (not partisan) ideology. Because the Minister’s judicial
appointments are inescapably political, ideology is a proper
consideration in selecting nominees for the bench. When
applicants say they support values like diversity, one should have
condence that they mean it. Including a question designed to tease
out an applicant’s normative value preferences, rather than the
government’s, will improve the quality of information available
to Judicial Advisory Committees and the Minister. To avoid the
risk that the applicant will uncritically adopt the government’s
position, any such question should not be one that is readily
identiable with the political Left or Right. Instead, it should
let applicants express a value preference on an issue that dees
traditional partisan divides. For instance, the Questionnaire might
ask: should Canada ban the exchange of cryptocurrencies (such
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as Bitcoin)? Should governments develop articial intelligence
programs to defend litigants who cannot afford a lawyer? Or, is
it more important for children to learn obedience or creativity?129
Such questions would reveal something about a judge’s beliefs
without providing an obvious cue or creating an expectation about
the “appropriate” answer. They also have two added benets. First,
they show how the applicant might approach a novel problem on
the bench, including the number, nature, quality, and diversity of
authorities upon which the applicant relies. Second, they compel
the applicant to educate herself and then speak intelligently on a
subject about which she may not have prior knowledge. As most
federally appointed judges serve on a bench of generalists who are
expected to settle a wide range of disputes—civil and criminal,
private and public—it is tting that they should answer such
questions, no matter how esoteric they may seem.
c. Pass legislation to codify the government’s commitment to
disclosure. A statute codifying the Department of Justice’s
promise to release successful applicants’ questionnaires would
obviate the need for individual consent, prevent future backlogs,
and make it clear that consent to disclose the questionnaire is a
condition of federal judicial appointment. To avoid a constitutional
challenge, the statute should make it clear that the Act does not
alter the Governor General’s prerogative to appoint any person
to the judiciary. A statute of this nature would be analogous to
Canada’s xed election date law.130 Legislation would have the
added benet of binding future governments to this practice, of
imposing legal time limits for disclosing the information, and of
normalizing the application process as a whole.
d. Improve the online visibility and accessibility of the questionnaires.
The Department of Justice should abandon technical transparency
and embrace enthusiastic compliance. That means not only
releasing the questionnaires promptly, but also promoting them
on the Department’s website as an educational resource. Answers
should be assembled in one place and featured prominently instead
of hyperlinked from an old press release.

129. These questions represent future controversies that are not popularly associated with a particular
political party. See Table S2, Supplementary Materials in Michael Macy et al, “Opinion Cascades and
the Unpredictability of Partisan Polarization” (2019) 5:8 Sci Adv eaax0754.
130. An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, SC 2007, c 10.
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Some will argue that the observations in this article harm the
reputations of the judges mentioned in it. They will suggest that this essay
undermines public condence in the judiciary. However, this criticism is
unfounded for three reasons. First, it overestimates the probable impact of
one law review article on the public’s condence in the judiciary. Second,
it ignores the diamonds in the rough—the gems that should give us all
condence in the decision-makers whom we have empowered to regulate
human affairs. Third, it denies the government’s agency in choosing to
publish this content and the judges’ own role in consenting to its release.
In a democratic society, citizens expect their institutions to be transparent
and accountable to them. Publishing judicial applications is an expression
of those values. If this article does real harm, then it is more an indictment
of the government’s decision to publish these questionnaires than it is a
comment on the wisdom of dissecting them.
This raises a second objection, which is that this article might
frighten the government away from its transparency initiative altogether
or discourage applicants for judicial ofce from being candid in their
answers. This too is a misleading objection for two reasons. First, as the
analysis above illustrates, the government has already shown itself to be
less than committed to its transparency promise. Second, if a study such as
this undermines the quality of judicial applicants or their applications, then
the blame lies squarely at the government’s feet. Surely, the government
did not undertake to publish judges’ answers thoughtlessly. The Minister
of Justice must have concluded that more condence would come from
their publication than from their concealment. That was a judgment call
the Minister was entitled to make. If she was wrong about it, then she
bears responsibility for that decision. It was reasonably foreseeable that a
novel treatment of these questionnaires would attract public comment. If
the Minister failed to anticipate that, then she was reckless as to whether
their publication might limit their utility in the hiring process.
The Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments is a gift that
keeps on giving. Judicial diversity, independence, impartiality, and
politics—the Questionnaire implicates them all and makes it possible to
understand the relationship between the judge and the judged in ways that
were unimaginable less than two years ago. This study has only scratched
the surface of possible inquiries. The sheer volume of new material
makes it ripe for analysis. Examining the answers to Questions 3 to 6 and
comparing the answers of judicial appointees in 2017 with those in 2018
are the next logical steps. Before judges’ applications became public, one
had to guess who comprised Canada’s judiciary. The beauty of publishing
responses to the Questionnaire is that, nally, Canadians can stop to guess
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and begin to know. At last, they can interrogate their condence in the
people they empower to settle disputes among them and in the processes
by which they put them there. But they cannot play this game alone. For
that, they will need a government willing to nish what it started. Only
then can Canadians win.
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APPENDIX A

All federal judges appointed from 1 January to 31 December 2017
whose application questionnaires the Department of Justice has publicly
undertaken to publish in part
Listed in order of appointment:
Date

Jurisdiction

Appointee

Court
Level

Excerpt
Released

3/9

PEI

Clements, Tracey L. (Q.C.)

Trial

3/9/2017

3/24

AB

deWit, William T. (Q.C.)

Trial

3/31/2017

3/24

AB

Hollins, Michele H. (Q.C.)

Trial

3/31/2017

3/24

AB

Khullar, Ritu (Q.C.)

Trial

4/19/2017

3/24

AB

Slawinsky, The Honourable Marilyn

Trial

3/31/2017

3/24

QC

Moore, Benoît

Trial

3/31/2017

4/7

ON

Paciocco, The Honourable David
M.

Appellate

4/7/2017

4/7

ON

Swartz, Deborah

Trial

4/7/2017

4/12

BC

Hunter, John James Lyon

4/12

BC

Mayer, Andrew Phillip Avtar

Trial

11/3/2017

4/12

ON

Bell, Robyn M. Ryan

Trial

5/5/2017

4/12

ON

Nakatsuru, The Honourable Shaun
S.

Trial

5/11/2017

5/4

QC

Bachand, Frédéric

Trial

5/4

QC

Baudouin, Christine

Trial

5/4

QC

Rogers, Karen M.

Trial

5/4

QC

Royer, Daniel

Trial

5/12

AB

Kubik, Johnna C.

Trial

5/12

BC

Riley, W. Paul (Q.C.)

Trial

5/12

NL

Chaytor, Sandra R. (Q.C.)

Trial

Appellate

5/12

NL

Knickle, Frances J. (Q.C.)

Trial

5/19

ON

Audet, Julie

Trial

5/19

ON

Desormeau, Hélène C.

Trial

5/19

ON

Favreau, Lise G.

Trial

5/19

ON

Monahan, Patrick J.

Trial

5/19

ON

O’Bonsawin, Michelle

Trial

5/19

ON

Shaw, M.J. Lucille

Trial

5/19

ON

Williams, Heather J.

Trial

6/9

BC

Branch, Ward K. (Q.C.)

Trial

6/9

Federal

Lafrenière, Roger R.

Trial

11/1/2017
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Date

Jurisdiction

Court
Level

6/9

NL

O’Brien, Francis P.

6/9

ON

Hurley, Patrick

Trial

Excerpt
Released

Appellate

6/9

QC

Quach, Aline U.K.

Trial

6/14

BC

Forth, Carla L. (Q.C.)

Trial

6/14

BC

Iyer, Nitya (Q.C.)

Trial

6/14

BC

Milman, Warren B.

Trial

6/14

BC

Tammen, Michael (Q.C.)

Trial

6/14

ON

de Sa, Chris

Trial

6/23

AB

Ashcroft, Janice R. (Q.C.)

Trial

6/23

BC

Brundrett, Michael J.

Trial

6/23

BC

Marchand, The Honourable Leonard
(Jr.)

Trial

6/23

BC

Shergill, Palbinder Kaur (Q.C.)

Trial

6/23

Federal

6/23

Federal

Pentney, William F. (Q.C.)

Trial

12/7/2018

6/23

ON

Gomery, Sally A.

Trial

11/3/2017

6/23

ON

Koehnen, Markus

Trial

6/23

ON

Petersen, Cynthia

Trial

6/23

ON

Schreck, The Honourable P. Andras

Trial

6/23

ON

Summers, Darlene L.

Trial

6/23

QC

Kalichman, Peter

Trial

6/23

QC

Vincent, Marie-France

Trial

7/18

NS

Brothers, Christa

Trial

7/18

NS

Derrick, The Honourable Anne

7/18

NS

Murray, Cindy

7/18

ON

Fairburn, The Honourable J. Michal

7/18

ON

McArthur, The Honourable Heather

Trial

7/18

ON

Sanlippo, Andrew A.

Trial

Laskin, John B.

11/3/2017

11/3/2017

Appellate

Appellate
Trial
Appellate131

131. Madam Justice Fairburn is notable because the government pledged to release her application
even though she was already a sitting trial judge at the time of her elevation to the Ontario Court
of Appeal. The government likely erred in undertaking to produce her application—e.g. the result
of copying and pasting an old news release—given that the announcements of such promotions
do not generally refer to the existence of an application. See e.g. the news release announcing the
appointment of Justice Claudine Roy to the Quebec Court of Appeal: Canada, Department of Justice,
News Release, “Government of Canada announces judicial appointments in the province of Quebec”
(17 August 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/08/government_of_
canadaannouncesjudicialappointmentsintheprovinceof.html> [perma.cc/3B25-8BZW].
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Date

Jurisdiction

Appointee

Court
Level

7/18

ON

Speyer, Jocelyn

Trial

7/18

QC

Gagnon, Marie-Paule

Trial

7/18

QC

Longpré, Mario

Trial

8/17

BC

Winteringham, Janet (Q.C.)

Trial

8/17

ON

Harris, David E.

Trial

8/17

QC

Moore, Gregory

Trial

9/15

Federal

Ahmed, Shirzad S.

Trial

9/29

AB

Mandziuk, Steven N. (Q.C.)

Trial

9/29

BC

E. David Crossin, Q.C.

Trial

9/29

ON

Dietrich, Bernadette

Trial

10/20

NB

Daigle, Chantal N.

Trial

10/20

NL

Khaladkar, Vikas

Trial

10/20

ON

Bawden, Peter G.

Trial

10/20

ON

MacPherson, George A.

Trial

10/20

QC

Dadour, François

Trial

10/27

ON

Kurz, The Honourable Marvin

Trial

10/27

PEI

Gormley, James W. (Q.C.)

Trial

10/27

PEI

MacPherson, Terri A. (Q.C.)

Trial

10/27

QC

Lachance, The Honourable Myriam

Trial

11/9

Federal

11/9

NL

Grammond, Sébastien

Trial

MacDonald, Alexander (Q.C.)

Trial

11/29

Federal

Favel, Paul (Q.C.)

Trial

11/29
11/29

QC

Breton, Isabelle

Trial

QC

Thibault, The Honourable Carl

Trial

11/29

SK

Leurer, Robert (Q.C.)

Trial

12/19

AB

Dunlop, Grant S. (Q.C.)

Trial

12/19

AB

Lema, Michael J.

Trial

12/19

BC

Marzari, Francesca

Trial

12/19

MB

Abel, Scott D.

Trial

12/19

ON

Copeland, The Honourable Jill M.

Trial

12/19

ON

London-Weinstein, Anne

Trial

12/19

ON

McArthur, The Honourable Michael
D.

Trial

12/19

QC

Brodeur, Johanne (Ad.E.)

Trial

Excerpt
Released
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APPENDIX B

All federal judges appointed from 1 January to 21 June 2018
whose application questionnaires the Department of Justice has publicly
undertaken to publish in part132
Listed in order of appointment:
Date

Jurisdiction

Appointee

Court
Level

Excerpt
Released

1/19

ON

Nishikawa, Sandra

Trial

1/19

QC

Nolin, Pascale

Trial

1/19

BC

Basran, Jasvinder S. (Bill)

Trial

3/26/2019

2/7

BC

MacDonald, Diane

Trial

3/25/2019

2/22

SK

MacMillan-Brown, Heather (Q.C.)

Trial

2/22

SK

McCreary, Meghan (Q.C.)

Trial

2/22

ON

Leef, Karen D.M.

Trial

2/22

AB

Burns, Marta E.

Trial

2/22

BC

Norell, Barbara J. (Q.C.)

Trial

4/13/2018

2/22

BC

Baker, Wendy (Q.C.)

Trial

1/25/2019

2/22

BC

Matthews, Sharon (Q.C.)

Trial

3/26/2019

2/26

Federal

Walker, Elizabeth

Trial

2/26

Federal

Norris, John

Trial

3/15

YT

Campbell, Edith M.

Trial

4/4

QC

Platts, David E.

Trial

4/4

QC

Frappier, Jérôme

Trial

4/4

MB

Champagne, R. Kenneth

Trial

11/23/2018

4/4

AB

Ho, L. Bernette

Trial

12/13/2018

4/12

AB

Bobb, Gaylene

Trial

5/1

AB

Labrenz, David (Q.C.)

Trial

5/4

AB

Neilson, James T. (Q.C.)

Trial

5/4

AB

Dilts, Nancy (Q.C.)

Trial

7/11/2018

5/4

AB

Kirker, Anne (Q.C.)

Trial

11/13/2018

5/4

AB

Fagnan, Jane A.

Trial

5/4

AB

Grosse, April D.

Trial

6/8/2018

7/11/2018

132. This list excludes Thomas J. Crabtree who was appointed to the British Columbia Supreme
Court on 4 May 2018. Although the government had pledged to release the questionnaires of those
it appointed before 22 June 2018, the press release announcing Justice Crabtree’s appointment, last
modied on 29 August 2018, makes no such promise.
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Date

Jurisdiction

Appointee

Court
Level

5/11

SK

Zerr, Krista L.133

Trial

5/24

ON

Champagne, Nathalie

Trial

5/24

ON

MacEachern, Pamela

Trial

5/24

ON

Nieckarz, Tracey J.

Trial

6/7

Tax Court

Monaghan, K.A. Siobhan

Trial

6/7

Tax Court

Wong, Susan

Trial

6/15

NB

Robichaud, Ivan (Q.C.)

Trial

6/15

BC

Gomery, Geoffrey B. (Q.C.)134

Trial

Excerpt
Released

8/1/2018
2/6/2019

133. The press release announcing Justice Zerr’s appointment purports to disclose her questionnaire;
however, the link is broken. A search of the Department’s website yields no results.
134. The link to Justice Geoffrey Gomery’s questionnaire is broken, but it is accessible by searching
the Department’s website.

